'Behind the Line of Truncheons': Crimes of the Powerful and the Policing of Valid Knowledge.

Dave Whyte

Abstract

This paper is concerned with the prospects for the development of criminological knowledge of the incidence of 'crimes of the powerful', as part of the current 'boom' in state-funded criminological knowledge. Following a brief analysis of the current trajectory of university based social science and a focus upon the scope and content of recent research commissioned by the Home Office, the paper turns to examine, with reference to an analysis of crime and disorder partnerships in the North West of England, the subject matter of data which informs local crime reduction and community safety strategies. The paper then discusses the forms of data that have been constructed as 'valid' by the Home Office, before concluding with a discussion of the prospects for the inclusion of 'crimes of the powerful' in future crime reduction agendas.

Introduction

Writing more than thirty years ago, Martin Nicolaus argued that western states' increasing tendency to resort to repression and social order maintenance was having a profound impact upon sociological research. As the use-value of sociology declined and funding for liberal sociological research faced a prolonged period of austerity in the US, one direction in which the sociologists would be forced in order to retain any marketable value would be in evaluating the impact and effectiveness of a rapidly expanding criminal justice system. Thus, the principle of utility was tying social research closely to the repressive apparatuses of the state:

When the ruling class switches its funds from sociological hardware to the hardware of sovereignty, the sociological profession has little alternative but to retreat behind the line of truncheons, hoping that the social organisation of repression will be inefficient enough in the eyes of its masters to warrant sociological research, so that something, at least can be salvaged. (Nicolaus, 1972: 56)

Now although Nicolaus was arguing about a specifically volatile period for the social sciences in the US at this time, the argument in this paper is that the "retreat behind the truncheons" serves as a useful rhetorical device for understanding current structural developments in UK criminology.

Knowledge production in criminology has been invigorated by a reconfiguration of government funding sources around criminological concerns, amongst them, the ESRC (Morgan, 2000) and the Foresight Panel on Crime Prevention (Tombs and Whyte, 2003a). Perhaps most dramatically, Home Office Research, Development and Statistics Department, a centrifugal and generative force in the production of criminological knowledge increased funding for research five fold between 1998/99 and 2001/02 (ibid.).
If the UK is a 'high crime' (or at least 'high criminal justice') society, it is perhaps unsurprising that criminological knowledge production and dissemination is, by those benchmarks, in the throws of a 'boom time'. The seemingly insatiable desire for producing criminological knowledge corresponds to an equally unquenchable thirst for the processing and punishment of growing numbers of criminalised individuals. In western societies, apparatuses of criminal justice and systems of punishment have in recent years resembled a malignant growth, nourished by huge reserves of public resources. In the UK, the degree to which this criminal justice expansionism has become a prevailing feature of the political landscape is demonstrated by the doubling of real terms spending on police forces in the past quarter century, and a prison population that by 2009 will have risen to over 90,000 - more than double the corresponding figure in 1990 (The Guardian, 10 December, 2002). At the same time, successive governments have rolled out a seemingly endless procession of criminal justice bills, each containing sweeping new powers. There have been more than 300 new criminal offences introduced by Labour governments since 1997 (Hillyard et. al., 2003), and 139 were introduced in 1999-2000 alone (Crawford, 2003). These are the elements of a wider, longer-term shift from a welfarist model of social policy, to a social policy dominated by the rhetoric and practice of crime control that is having a profound impact upon the social organisation and mobilisation of state resources. It is a process that is also having a profound impact upon the structure of social science and university research.

Within the context of those broader trends in criminology, this paper examines the prospects for the development of criminological knowledge of the incidence of 'crimes of the powerful', as part of the current 'boom' in state-funded criminological research. Following a brief analysis of the current trajectory of university based social science and a focus upon the scope and content of recent research commissioned by the Home Office, the paper turns to examine, with reference to an analysis of crime and disorder partnerships in the North West of England, the subject matter of data which informs local crime reduction and community safety strategies. It then goes on to examine in detail the role played by particular forms of criminological knowledge in the construction of those strategies, before concluding with a discussion of the prospects for the inclusion of 'crimes of the powerful' in future crime reduction agendas.

Restructuring University Research

Over the past quarter century or so, the Higher Education sector in the UK and in other western countries has been the subject of several waves of reductions in grant from central government (Slaughter and Leslie, 1997). The effect has been to force universities to look outside the normal avenues of funding for research support. In the 'old' university sector, between 1980 and 1990 external research grants and contracts as a proportion of total university income had risen from 15% to 23% (Phillips, 1994: 43). More recently, this strategy of austerity has deepened. Between 1983 and 1999 public research funds declined by 20% in real terms (Monbiot, 2000: 263). This trend is set to continue (HEFCE, 1999: 5). Structurally, the marketisation of research has been encouraged (and indeed deemed necessary) by political reforms to the funding regime for higher education. As a consequence, over the past quarter of a century, links between university departments and external sponsors have developed in the context of a massive expansion of the higher education sector and, at the same time, steady cuts in state funding for both teaching and research (Tombs and Whyte, 2003a).

This regime of austerity that has swept through the social sciences and beyond has been a key tool in entrenching the principle of utility: strengthening the reliance of academics upon research dominated by policy or industrial requirements. In other words, the enduring logic of the restructuring of university research is that the market must by necessity be ever more finely tuned to the requirements of business or the state. (Lipsey, 2000; Blair, 1999). Schlesinger has noted of a speech made by David Blunkett to the ESRC when he was responsible for the Department for Education and Employment: For the Secretary of State, the root choice was simple: make yourself handy on my terms or be condemned for insufferable detachment. Academic social science is evidently seen as needing to become a service industry for government policy making. It is clear, more broadly,
that he intends the Research Assessment Exercise...to be increasingly focused on policy and practice. (Schlesinger, 2001: 183; see also Department for Education and Employment, 2000)

There has certainly been a concerted and sustained attempt to consolidate criminology within this 'utility' agenda. According to the head of the Home Office Research Development and Statistics Department, Paul Wiles:

The push towards evidence based policy making in Britain creates a mechanism for that at the heart of government....for criminology to be a public good [it] must be capable of producing knowledge which can be used to pursue the public good....since we live in democracies, the construction of government policy constitutes a public good (Wiles, 2001: 3).

In Wiles' vision, knowledge production, rather than being an end in itself, is understood as a means to promote and develop the Home Office agenda. It is an assumption that does little service to notions of academic freedom, or independence. For, despite the growing army of 'embedded' criminologists who do precious little else but conduct government research, and despite the fact that we do indeed live a democracy, the Home Office agenda is one that by no means commands consensus in criminology.

Consensual or not, in recent years knowledge production in the field of criminology has, closely related to external demand, been expanding at a fearsome rate. New courses in criminology and criminal justice proliferate in higher and further education, often in institutions where other social science and sociology courses are struggling to recruit students. The conveyor belt of text books in criminology has kept pace with demand, as new imprints, and even new publishers have emerged to boost this market (witness Willan Publishing's latest 2003 catalogue, with 95 criminology books published since 2000 on offer). Over the past 6 years or so, a new generation of journals in criminology has been born (in the UK alone, those include Theoretical Criminology, Criminal Justice Policy, Youth Justice and the British Journal of Community Justice), as existing journals such as the British Journal of Criminology expand the volume of papers they publish.

The current "boom time" for criminology, then, can be placed in the context of marketisation of universities and the demand for research with a utility value. It is a boom period that is not being shared equally throughout the social sciences. Anecdotal evidence from colleagues around the country seems to indicate that there has been a comparative slow down in the recruitment of students to social policy and sociology courses in many institutions. Thus, for example, a recent survey of heads of social policy departments in the UK found the single largest problem for those departments was the recruitment of students. If those indicators reflect a real trend, it is a trend that is not simply related to lack of demand for those courses, but also to a general restructuring of funding priorities in academic departments:

[In the 2002 RAE] the law panel awarded a 5 or 5* to 63 per cent of all units submitted, the sociology panel awarded a 5 or 5* to 37% of the departments who submitted, and the social policy and administration panel awarded these grades to only 21% of their units. Using data for individuals as opposed to units, we find that some 85% of all lawyers are in grade 5 or 5* departments compared with 51% of sociologists and 31% of social policy colleagues. This means that there are now nearly three times as many lawyers as social policy colleagues in these top graded departments (Hillyard et. al., 2003).

For one reason or another, social policy and sociology is failing to get prioritised by this key mechanism for allocating university department funding. Little wonder then that social policy and sociology departments are following the money, and offering undergraduate programmes in criminology and criminal justice.

The intensifying demand for degrees in criminology in relation to other areas of social policy and social science may be connected to rising student debt and the need for vocationally relevant qualifications. Criminology courses increasingly seem to be filled by would-be police officers, probation officers and "Crackers". Given the proliferation of criminal justice professionals and the growing numbers of social services staff involved in youth justice work, crime-related risk assessments and so on, not to mention the growing numbers of criminal justice professionals enrolling on part-time criminology degrees, this is perhaps unsurprising. Criminology may well be perceived now by school leavers as the vocational social science subject.

The current research environment in universities is one in which both teaching and research has been tied to government and industry's functional requirements. The structural imperative to produce research with a use value for the wealthiest and most powerful groups in society has become overwhelming. Whilst these are exciting times for researchers interested in the
same questions that powerful state and corporate actors are interested in, at the same time, criminologists are entitled to question whether this is an environment that is equally likely to foster research into the harms and crimes committed by those very same actors. In other words, those trends may well be influencing the substance of criminological research. It is to this point that the rest of this paper is addressed: namely the prospects for a boom time for research into the crimes of the powerful that is concomitant with the current boom in criminological research. Before exploring in detail the scope for inclusion of crimes of the powerful on local crime reduction agendas, the paper now turns to examination of the current Home Office research agenda.

**Bringing it all Back Home I: the Home Office and Criminology**

The trends alluded to above are perhaps most starkly illustrated with reference to the current Home Office research budget.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Budget (£)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998/99</td>
<td>£2,754,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999/00</td>
<td>£9,279,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000/01</td>
<td>£17,013,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001/02</td>
<td>£17,389,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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This table shows a budget increase of more than 500% for research commissioned by the Home Office Research Development and Statistics Directorate (RDS) between 1998/99 and the 2000/01. The RDS themselves rationalise this increase in funding with reference to the current government's enthusiasm for 'evidence-led policy' (personal communication with RDS, 5 December, 2000). The massive growth of Home Office funding for criminological research in recent years may also partly be understood as a response to the need to evaluate the activities of the growing numbers of local criminal justice 'partnerships' (see Crawford, 1997 and 1998; and Hughes, 1998) and initiatives funded by the Crime Reduction Programme (Home Office, 2000a).

In terms of the government's twin mantras of 'what works' and 'evidence-based policy', there is objective reason to expect that a proportion of this funding might be earmarked for research into the crimes of the powerful. For example, the Home Office has made statements on its intention to introduce policy reforms in at least two areas of corporate crime, namely the introduction of both a new law on corporate killing (Centre for Corporate Accountability, 2002), and of a new super-agency to deal with large-scale financial fraud (Guardian, 14 April, 2002). Similarly, there is reason to believe that the government's commitment to 'evidence-based policy' would demand some attention to the crimes committed by state servants. Labour's gradual phasing out of crown immunity in certain state institutions and the introduction of the Human Rights Act (1999) indicates that there are irrefutable reasons for conducting evaluations of policy which impact upon state criminality and criminal liability - not least for state institutions under the remit of the Home Office. In this respect, it is of the utmost relevance that in one measure at least, the British government has a shameful human rights record, largely as a result of the war in Northern Ireland. Over the last 3 decades, the British government was found guilty by the European Court of violations of human rights more times than all other European Union states combined (Rolston, 2002: 60).

Moreover, in its 'Statement of Purpose', the Home Office could quite easily incorporate a concern for research that seeks to explore, understand and minimise state and corporate illegality:

To build a safe, just and tolerant society in which the rights and responsibilities of individuals, families and communities are properly balanced and the protection and security of the public are maintained and enhanced. (http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/)

If there is one point of convergence and consensus amongst criminologists on the question of the crimes of the powerful, it is that the crimes committed by corporations alone have a far more devastating social and economic impact, kill and maim many times more people than 'street violence' and produce thefts on a scale that dwarfs any comparable 'conventional crime.' (for example, Box, 1983; Slapper and Tombs, 1999). It is all the more remarkable,
then, that those forms of crime have rarely been the subject of research (Levi, 1987, preface; Tombs and Whyte, 2003a). Yet for those of us looking for state-sponsored research on crimes of the powerful beyond the universities, it is probably wise not to hang around outside the front door of Queen Anne’s Gate holding our breath. The largest single source of this steep rise in the RDS budget is the government’s Crime Reduction Programme (CRP), a Home Office pool of funding worth £250m (made available after the 1998 government spending review) which is open to competitive bids from local crime prevention partnerships. The RDS is allocated £2.5m in running costs for administration of the CRP, and £9-£10m which is ‘ring-fenced’ to fund projects in the programme (ibid.). These projects are mainly concerned with the evaluation and technical development of situational crime prevention (for example, Geographical Information Systems (GIS), CCTV, and so on). A further £1.9m of the RDS budget is ring-fenced for drug research (Home Office, 2000b). Thus, it is apparent that almost every penny of the 500% increase in RDS external research budget is dedicated to policy areas that remain tightly organised around the CRP ‘situational’ crime control agenda or the ‘war on drugs’ agenda.

In fact, the Home Office’s recent record in relation to researching forms of serious crime which implicate powerful corporations or state servants is quantifiable. A catalogue of Home Office research reports gives us a clear indication of this record (Home Office, 2002). The catalogue details a total of 571 research reports published by the Home Office since 1988 and still in print in April 2002. Again, there has been a recent rise in Home Office research output. Reports with publication dates of 1998 and 1999 number some 116, whilst reports with publication dates of 2000 and 2001 total 221. Within this research output, there are ten research reports which deal with crimes against businesses, but none - not one single report - which deals with crimes which have been committed as part of legitimate business activities. Given the priority afforded to the rhetoric of ‘evidence-based policy’, and the current policy developments on such topics outlined above, this is a glaring omission. There is a similar absence of reports on questions of state illegalities. There have been a few reports into deaths of prisoners in custody and under community supervision (Bucke and Brown, 1997; Leigh et al, 1998; Sattar, 2001a and 2001b), and one on deaths resulting from police vehicle accidents (Rix et al., 1997). But, with the exception of one paragraph describing the numbers of police officers prosecuted for driving incidents (ibid.: 35), not one of these reports discusses the criminal responsibility of state servants.

There is no room on Home Office research agendas for researching the prevalence and mitigation of crimes such as environmental pollution offences, product safety or mortgage and pension fraud. This tendency within the state both reflects and reinforces criminology’s historical concern with a narrow definition of crime (Lacey, 1995), almost exclusively crime committed by poor and relatively powerless offenders (Tombs and Whyte, 2002).

**Community Safety and Partnerships**

Some commentators have argued that the delivery of local crime control in the UK at the end of the 20th century began to occupy a broader, more inclusive terrain suggested by the term ‘crime prevention’ in that it is closely associated (in government sources at least) with the notion of ‘community safety’. There also seems to be a consensus amongst commentators that ‘community safety’ denotes an approach which encapsulates a broader range of phenomena than the traditional concerns of crime prevention (see Gilling 1997; Crawford 1998). It is a careful reorientation of language which also signifies that a range of agencies beyond police forces are to be involved in the management of community safety:

The term ‘crime prevention’ is often narrowly interpreted and this reinforces the view that it is solely the responsibility of the police. On the other hand, the term ‘community safety’ is open to wider interpretation and could encourage greater participation from all sections of the community in the fight against crime. (Home Office, 1991: para 3.6, cited in Mariow and Pitts, 1998)

It also becomes clear from this definition that a wider understanding of the causes and effects of crime via the concept of community safety, in theory at least, provides us with the opportunity to move beyond the narrow confines of ‘crime prevention’ to look at the social
causes and impacts of crime, not least of all, those which coalesce around a range of social inequalities (Crawford, 1998; Hughes, 1999; and Newburn, 2000). The Crime and Disorder Act (CDA) represented Labour's legislative endorsement of 'community safety' as the driving force behind new strategies of crime control.

At the heart of these strategies is the formalisation of partnership arrangements as the principle mechanism for dealing with crime and community safety problems. Under the CDA, crime and disorder partnerships were invited to conceptualise their role and remit in as broad terms as possible. Thus, the guidance on partnerships, issued as a supplement to the Act, invited local partners to think laterally about the preparation of strategies and even to approach their new duties in ways other than those suggested in the guidance: "Crucially the Act does not prescribe in any detail what the agenda for the local partnership should be, nor what structures will be needed to deliver that agenda." (Home Office, 1998: foreword) Thus, The Crime and Disorder Act deliberately avoids attempting to define the terms 'crime' or 'disorder' within this context. Nor does it impose any list of particular topics which every strategy must address.....Within reason, nothing is ruled out and nothing is ruled in. (ibid.: 1.43)

Key documents here are the published crime and disorder audits which are ostensibly aimed at establishing localised issues of priority, thereby providing a base of evidence for the 3 yearly strategies of crime and disorder partnerships. There is more than enough in the detail of the Home Office CDA guidance for partnerships to indicate that local crime reduction partnerships create new possibilities for reinvigorating local crime/community safety agendas, responsive to local needs. Official rhetoric thus suggests that those agendas are now capable of including illegalities and forms of serious harm normally ignored by the criminal justice system. Not least of all, the remit issued to crime and disorder partnerships appears elastic enough for offences associated with powerful actors to be considered for inclusion in local community safety strategies. Thus, the Health and Safety Executive are singled out in the guidance as a suggested partnership member. Moreover, the guidance establishes the scope for a wide range of non-statutory organisations to be included in partnerships: "There is a range of local and national organisations with particular knowledge and expertise relevant to crime and disorder." (ibid.: 2.32) Again, the advice here is not prescriptive, and, although those specifically mentioned are the large criminal justice voluntary agencies with established links to the state (NACRO, Crime Concern, Neighbourhood Watch, Victim Support), the tone of the guidance does suggest that community groups with a broad interest in 'community safety' should be considered for inclusion.

Hypothetically, then, an open-minded reading of the Home Office's guidance for the CDA appears to welcome a more safety or harm conscious approach which proposes imaginative and locally driven crime prevention and community safety agendas. The concept of 'community safety', applied via the new institutional mechanisms created by the Crime and Disorder Act, has on the face of things, provided local partnerships with considerable opportunities to stretch the frontiers of criminality. We might have expected a challenge to 'crime' as a taken for granted category (Lacey, 1995), or even a reconstitution of local definitions of the harms that remain marginal to crime-ology (Muncie, 1998).

But this hypothesis may not be particularly sound in the context of the role envisaged for business in the new partnership structure. For, despite the inclusive rhetoric, neither crimes committed by business or state servants are granted so much as a mention. In terms of the former, the guidance establishes a powerful rhetorical obstacle in terms of the particular role envisaged for business:

Businesses are central to the life of the communities and of course, suffer from the consequences of crime....The relationship with business must be a two-way one. Again, police and local authorities will be expected to listen to the views of the business sector and to encourage their active participation. (ibid.: 2.33)
Crime and Disorder Audits and Strategies in the North West of England

Despite this distinctly pro-business emphasis, it remains the case that the official documentation which supports crime and disorder partnerships is dominated by the inclusive rhetoric of safety and partnership. The following analysis of crime and disorder audits and strategies seeks to provide an indication of the extent to which the CDA has actually encouraged local crime reduction partnerships to break the traditional crime control mould. The analysis is concerned with crime and disorder partnerships in the government office regional area of the North West of England. In this analysis, only 2nd generation audits and strategies are sampled; that is, those published in 2002. The analysis is comprised of 2 elements: firstly, a brief assessment and discussion of the priority areas earmarked for the next 3 years by crime and disorder partnerships; and secondly, a more detailed focus on 8 partnership areas in the North West of England where there are established problems in relation to ‘crimes of the powerful’, and where local communities have been active in labelling this activity as ‘crime’.

Table 1 shows the current target priority areas of 26 crime and disorder partnerships in the North West of England, as indicated by ‘target’ issues identified in their strategies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority issue identified in strategy</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle crime</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug related crime/substance abuse</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent crime</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Social Behaviour/neighbour nuisance*</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Offending/causing annoyance</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road safety/speeding</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Violence</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear of Crime*</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire Safety/Arson</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vandalism/criminal damage</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racist violence and racial harassment</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimes against business</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Disorder&quot;</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduce crime rates</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repeat victimisation</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcohol related offending</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hate crime</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town centre crime</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduce re-offending rates</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural and community harmony*</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve access to services for offenders*</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuisance calls*</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Increase membership of Home Watch*  
Increase reported crime rates  
Reduce victimisation of over 60s  
Removal of abandoned vehicles*  
Truancy*  

Table 1 represents a spread of 30 different crime reduction issues across the 26 sampled areas. A first point to note is that the top ten on this list reproduces almost exactly the Home Office priorities as set out in the Crime Reduction Strategy. Three issues dominate government policy statements on crime: Vehicle Crime; Burglary; and Youth offending. This is also reflected in their position in the table above. A second point to note is that there are only 8 issues on this list (marked *) which do not feature in some form in police recorded crime data. Third, there are also striking similarities with national trends. Of the top 13 target issues (those which featured as targets in 5 strategies or more), 10 feature on a similar national list of partnership target priorities.

An impressively wide range of invited members are present on crime and disorder partnerships in the North West of England. On those fora, in addition to the statutory agencies, it is possible to find local tenants associations, local housing associations, voluntary organisations, representatives from secondary and tertiary education authorities and institutions and public transport companies. Yet, none of the 26 partnerships in the sample included representatives from any of the agencies responsible for regulating serious corporate offences: trading standards and environmental health departments; the Environment Agency; or the Health and Safety Executive. Indeed, there is no evidence of those organisations either having been invited, or actually requesting to be involved (personal communication, Government Office for the North West Region, 12 July, 2002). Businesses on the other hand tend to be involved in crime and disorder partnerships. Several partnerships in the sample included representatives from the local Chamber of Commerce, and representatives of individual businesses were common-place on partnerships, including a brewery (in West Lancashire) and a local newspaper (in Barrow-on-Furness). Completely absent from partnership membership are any local/community organisations active in identifying corporate or state harms and offences.

**Eight Crime Hotspots**

In the sample area, the North West of England, examples of threats to communities posed by crimes of the powerful are both real and quantifiable; and can be understood both as issues of community safety, and crime control. According to the HSE figures for the North West of England, in 2000/01, 40 workers and members of the public were killed by work activity. In the same year, 2,612 workers suffered major injuries at work (for example, major fractures, serious head injuries, and amputations), and 13,351 workers sustained injuries serious enough to keep them off work for more than 3 days (HSE, 2002). Although those figures appear severe enough, if we allow for the myriad problems associated with HSE reporting, the true figure of deaths caused by work is likely to be at least 5 times the HSE recorded figure (Tombs, 1999). Moreover, it is the case that most of those deaths can be unambiguously described as crimes. By the HSE's own assessment, a large majority of injuries and deaths at work are a result of criminal breaches of the Health and Safety at Work Act (Pearce and Tombs, 1998: 153). HSE's resort to enforcement action and prosecution in the North West of England is also quantifiable. In 2000/01, there were 1655 enforcement notices issued for breaches of health and safety law. During the same year, 254 prosecutions were initiated and 205 convictions secured by HSE (HSE, 2002). The Environment Agency initiated 98 prosecutions in the North West of England in 2001/02: 1 for flood defence offences; 1 for process industry regulation offences; 2 for breaches of radioactive substance regulations; 62 for waste offences; and 32 for water quality and water regulation offences (personal contact, Environment Agency, 16 July, 2002). Another rather different issue of environmental safety in the North West of England might, in strictly legal terms, be legitimately described as 'state crime'. There are four beaches in the North West where levels of bacteria breach European Union (EU) imperative water quality standards.
Almost half (4 out of 9) of the total number of beaches which currently fail to comply with EU regulations in England and Wales are in the North West of England. This is a matter of a long-running legal dispute between the UK government and the EU, and has been the reason for one conviction and two pending cases against the UK in the European Court of Justice (Edie Weekly Summaries, 2001; personal contact, Sefton Metropolitan Borough Council, 16 July, 2002).

In the North West of England, then, there are several locations where risks to public health and the local environment associated with industry are both acute and visible. Perhaps most infamous in this respect are the chemical cities of the Mersey Basin, predominantly located in the towns of Warrington, Widnes, Ellesmere Port and Runcorn. This area is said to be the most heavily concentrated area of chemical production sites in Western Europe. It is, by a long way, the most concentrated site of carcinogen production in the UK, if not Europe. Just two plants (IEOS Chlor in Halton, and AOC in Ellesmere Port and Neston) between them release into the air around 4 tonnes per year (40% of the UK total) of factory produced cancer-causing chemicals. It is a place where chemical spills and the leaching and leakage of toxic substances occur with alarming regularity. It is in those locations that some of the most persistent patterns of corporate offending are to be found. The Environment Agency’s list of the worst environmental offenders was topped by ICI Runcorn in 1999. ICI were convicted 12 times in 1997 and 1998 for offences at the Runcorn plant (personal contact with Regional Solicitor, Environment Agency, 10 March 2000).

On the Cumbrian coast, the Sellafield Nuclear reprocessing plant has been the site of several radioactive leaks and one high profile explosion since the ‘Windscale fire’ in 1957, widely claimed to be the world’s first nuclear accident. The backlog of waste stored at Sellafield constitutes, according to the US Institute for Resource and Security Studies (cited in Greenpeace, 2001), “one of the worlds most dangerous concentrations of long-lived radioactive material”, which causes, according to some epidemiological studies, approximately 200 fatal cancer cases and 1,300 skin cancers every year (ibid.). Workers at the plant are financially compensated for most cancers, since the company (BNFL) recognises a probability that such illnesses are caused by work at the plant. Serious leaks of radioactive material continue to be uncovered regularly, the most recent in April 2002 (CORE Briefing[14] 07/02). The poisoning of the Irish Sea, said to be the most radioactive stretch of sea in the world, by the Sellafield plant has become the subject of a major diplomatic row between the UK and Irish governments. Ireland has been unsuccessful in its application to a UN tribunal to prevent the process of producing mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel being resumed (Ananova, 3rd December 2001), but has signalled its intent to take the case to the European Court of Justice (The Irish Times, 13th October, 2001). In the UK, the plant has not fared so well in the dock; the courts now impose convictions for health and safety crimes at a rate of at least 1 or 2 per year (see The Observer, 30 July, 2000; CORE Briefing, 11/01 and 04/02).

In looking at those environmental ‘hotspots’ then, we can say on the basis of this evidence that these locations are objectively definable as areas where we can find persistent and serious illegalities. Those hotspots are located in the following Crime and Disorder partnership areas:

- Of the 4 officially dirty beaches, two (at North Scale and Askam-in-Furness) are located in the Barrow-in-Furness area, one (at Cartmel Sands) is in the South Lakeland District area, and one (at Ainsdale) in Sefton;
- Sellafield is in the Borough of Copeland;
- the large majority of the Mersey Basin chemical facilities are located across four local authority areas: Ellesmere Port and Neston, Wirral, Halton and Warrington.

On close examination of the content of the crime and disorder audits in each of the 8 environmental ‘hotspots’, however, the first point to observe is that none of those audits include even a passing acknowledgement of the types of illegalities in relation to environmental harms committed with such regularity in each local authority area. Neither are the statutory agencies which deal with various forms of corporate crime, nor relevant community/environmental groups included as members of the partnership. It is perhaps instructive to note at this point that the Wirral and Warrington audits both include detailed data on crimes against business (the later audit includes an 8 page section on ‘business crime’), yet nothing of crimes that victimise workers or members of the public, or damage the environment.
Missed Opportunities for Local Crime and Disorder Strategies

The absence of 'crimes of the powerful' from local audits is not merely an issue about the visibility or incompleteness of our knowledge about those offences in a self-contained sense. Actually the omission of the prevalence and impact of some of those crimes renders invisible or distorts a range of related safety and harm issues. In other words, to know about the crimes of the powerful is to know about a range of other problems, including the distribution and impact of health problems or of patterns of poverty to name but two. If we examine the audits in those hotspot areas from this perspective, there are a series of missed opportunities to understand comprehensively the full impact of crime on those communities or to provide a more nuanced account of the data reproduced in the audit. Let me highlight an example of what I mean by this.

Halton has the highest standard mortality rate[17] of all local authorities in the country. This indicator is reproduced in the audit alongside a proclamation in the Borough of Halton's Audit that: "The Local Strategic Partnership has identified health issues as one of its top 5 priorities for the regeneration of the area." Yet, there is nothing in this audit that mentions the production of toxic and carcinogenic chemicals in the area, never mind an attempt to link the chemical industry to the high mortality rate. It is a link that is established officially in other government research. For example the Department of Health estimates that industrial and transport pollution is a major cause of premature death in the UK, causing at least 10,000 such fatalities each year (Coleman et al, 2002: 95). This is not simply an issue of 'community safety', but, given the number of pollution offences committed regularly by private companies in the area, health problems may be linked to the cumulative effects of environmental illegality. The absence of any attempt to tell this story, despite the local Health Authority's presence as an established partner, considerably weakens the audit. When the social costs of the crimes of the powerful are rendered less visible in local crime control agendas, this is bound to have wider implications for the construction of priorities for social policy. If policy makers' knowledge of the problem is incomplete, how can we expect policy interventions to be effective?

We might also say raise the same question about the economic costs of crime. The audits published in Ellesmere Port and Neston, Halton, and Warrington all include detailed calculations of economic costs to the local community of a range of crimes. Most, if not all, of those estimates are based upon a calculations of data derived from Home Office estimates of notifiable offences. Although one of the problems with existing data on the economic costs of corporate offending is that it is, at best, only indicative, it is still possible to conclude (even from ball-park calculations) that corporate and state crimes in all of their diverse forms would surely dwarf the cost estimates of conventional crimes (for approaches to estimating the costs of corporate crime, see Slapper and Tombs, 1999: 57-67: 78-79). Such a finding in itself could provide persuasive economic evidence for the local crime and disorder strategy to be refocused. Indeed, there may also be a persuasive case that tackling pollution and environmental offending would in a more long-term sense contribute to community regeneration strategies.

Although all of the audits in the qualitative sample draw primarily upon police recorded crime data, most (Sefton, Barrow, Warrington, Halton, South Lakeland) included some form of survey (with data gathered either by focus groups, by questionnaires, or both) of the local population. From the methodological detail provided to varying degrees in the audits, it appears that questionnaires are, for the most part based upon the Home Office categories of notifiable offences or questions which give respondents the option to choose from a small range of offences (in South Lakeland's audit, the choice is from: car theft, theft from cars, burglary, and robbery; in Barrow's audit, the choice is from: drugs, car crime, youth crime, violence and burglary). Most ask about 'fear of crime' and basic questions about what could be done to reduce crime and disorder. It is impossible to make more than the most elementary of comparisons in relation to this data, given the wildly variant methods used. But perhaps the most striking similarity was that most surveys asked respondents to rank the priority issues in their area from a choice of categories of crime. Although the number and ranges of 'crimes' on those lists varied between audits, they were all constructed from a mix of Home Office categories of notifiable offences, and current Home Office priorities (youth crime, fear of crime and 'disorder'; see Home Office, 2002). Of course, as this paper has already noted, corporate and state crime have no place in those definitions of the crime
problem. Yet, it is not unheard of for public crime surveys to investigate exposure to corporate crime. The Second Islington Crime Survey asked respondents questions relating to commercial crime, health and safety and pollution offences (Pearce, 1990). But in the sampled audits, the closest we get to finding an issue which some may describe as non-traditional in terms of crime prevention issues (see Coleman et al, 2002) which did emerge in those surveys was that of road safety (see also table 1 above). In Warrington, respondents questioned about what constituted the big problem in their neighbourhood, the combined answer of ‘cars driven at excessive speed’ and ‘road safety’ featured in no less than 44.6% of answers, dwarfing other concerns. This finding alone suggests that surprising results may be obtained when a fuller range of ‘crime’ issues are covered in local surveys. In so far as none of the audits include survey questions on harms associated with environmental crime, consumer fraud as so on, this represents a missed opportunity to include illegalities of undeniable significance to local communities in the North West of England.

To the extent that the CDA actually represented an opportunity for pushing the boundaries of crime control beyond its traditional preoccupations with relatively powerless groups of offenders, it appears to have failed. New Labour’s symbolic reorientation towards community safety is rhetorically, at least, aimed at producing more locally tailored strategies and tackling a wider range of threats to ‘quality of life’. But there is little evidence that this reorientation has extended beyond the parameters of acceptable debate established by Home Office agendas.

**Bringing it All Back Home II: The Home Office and the Policing of Valid Data**

As the analysis outlined earlier in this paper indicates comparisons between partnership priorities and Home Office agenda suggest strongly a lack of diversity in local crime control agendas. Those findings seem to suggest, at the very least, a lack of imagination on the part of crime and disorder partnerships. The findings also reflect the proliferation of ‘benchmarking’ and the audit technocracy which is blossoming around this process. As New Labour stumbles onward along the path of actuarial enlightenment, the government continues to gorge on its seemingly limitless appetite for targets and ‘measurables’; the numerical indices that are easily auditable and are able to present rational, scientific ‘solutions’ to the crime problem. The local auditing process has more than lived up to central government’s expectations on this front. Indeed, the auditing process has revealed an almost infinite variety of ways of presenting crime data. Technologically speaking, this is thanks, in the main, to GIS, the relatively new science of ‘hotspot’ mapping (see Hirschfield and Bowers, 1997; Hirschfield and Bowers, 1998; for a longer, more general discussion of the application and use of GIS systems, see Bottoms and Wiles, 1997: 316-330). Application of the data generally involves the plotting of victim, offender and offence locations, alongside other required ‘neighbourhood’ data, superimposed on maps that may correspond to police beat areas or to local authority wards. The result is a complex map which projects ‘hotspot’ crime areas onto maps on a variety of scales: often calibrated per 100 square meters, and sometimes as detailed as each postcode group of residences. Virtually without exception, local authority areas with the technical capacity to produce GIS mapping do use this data in their audits (personal communication, Home Office Police and Reducing Crime Unit, 9 July, 1999). The development of GIS datasets, aimed at creating complex patterns of knowledge about local areas and populations from which they are largely kept secret, represents a part of a growing body of new “crime science” (McLaughlin, 2002: 49) conceived in pre-CDA crime control partnerships and now seminal to the work of partnerships (see also, Whyte, 2002).

Of course the use of GIS data in crime audits in their present form - mapping crimes committed in public places or in residential areas, rather than other locations such as workplaces - facilitates the construction of the debate around business and crime as understood in terms of protecting business against theft and criminal damage, and not in terms of protecting workers and the community from illegal trading and working practices. More generally, ‘situational’, ‘problem oriented’ approaches have been widely criticised for their narrow focus upon crime in public places, for their inability to tackle root causes of crime, for their temporality and for a series of socially damaging and divisive impacts caused not
least by the punitive segregation and intense surveillance demanded by situational crime prevention (see Crawford, 1998: 98-102). Yet it says much about the importance of the new crime science to the construction of crime prevention and community safety agendas that despite its intrinsic problems, the reproduction of GIS data remains dominant in crime and disorder audits. Indeed, judging by the special mention reserved for ‘hotspot’ analysis and GIS in the Home Office benchmarking toolkit for crime and disorder partnerships, it seems that GIS has emerged as the most influential government sanctioned and sponsored crime science (see, http://www.crimereduction.gov.uk/toolkits/p0314.htm). It is estimated that, at a minimum, three quarters of all crime and disorder audits include the presentation of data using GIS software packages (personal communication, Home Office Police and Reducing Crime Unit, 9 July, 1999). This is a rough approximation but it is consistent with the audits published in the North West of England.

The power to govern through the bidding process should not be under-estimated. Huge sums of money circulate in this process (central government grants for CCTV alone are worth more than £21.5m to crime and disorder partnerships in the North West of England[19]) and those resources have a profound impact upon the ability of local partnerships to meet their declared targets. Merseyside is but one police force area where the Chief Constable ranks local partnership funding bids from the 5 crime and disorder partnerships in the area for the Home Office according to their suitability and consistency with local crime control partnership priorities (Whyte, 2002). Little wonder, then, that in this context at least, the key evaluative indicators tend to be the ‘hard’ figures of recorded crime or involve GIS techniques which in turn can be fed into police performance measures.

The content of crime and disorder audits themselves is monitored both by the Home Office (see Phillips et al, 2000) and, more closely, by the government offices for the regions. The latter monitor the auditing process as it is being conducted via tick-box evaluations, and maintain the line of communication between local community safety officers and central government. A key part of this process is the evaluation of these data sets - particularly in terms of the methods used in the auditing process, and how the subject matter ‘fits’ with the targets as set out in strategies. Lurking somewhere in the background, as we might expect, is an insistence that audits and strategies fit somehow with New Labour’s ‘what works’ fetishism. Indeed, much of the regional-level evaluation process is taken up with tick-box questions on the data sets used, how they relate to strategy targets, how they fit with Home Office priorities and so on. Behind the work of partnerships, then, an over-bearing structural dynamic demands the construction of particular types of data to identify problems, evaluates the initiatives that deal with those problems and then feeds these very same data back into the loop. Bar the summaries made available in audits, these data sets are not generally available to the public.

Crimes of the Powerful, Neo-liberalism and Valid Data

In the absence of alternative, robust forms of data that can form a basis for comparison across partnerships, it is unlikely the crimes of the powerful will easily re-appear on national and local crime control agendas. This may be partly a historical/technical problem of the availability of alternative data and of how to generate the most suitable data for evaluation purposes. From behind the line of truncheons, then, local crime and disorder audits have produced a narrow and incomplete criminological knowledge. They have reproduced a narrow and incomplete vision of the problem of crime that owes more to the Home Office vision than it does to the reality of community safety problems experienced by local communities. But the argument here is not simply that the Home Office consecration of particular forms of data (which degrade the validity of the crimes of the powerful from the auditing process) renders the auditing process pointless, or that we should disregard the emergent local forms of criminological knowledge unless they include the full range of harms generated by illegal activity. This paper is not arguing along the lines of an epistemological nihilism (Wiles, 2001: 9). On the contrary, within the heavily actuarial ‘what works’ agenda as it currently exists, another vision is easily possible. Hughes (2000; see also, Hughes 2002: 132-133) has noted generally, under New Labour’s vision of community safety, what works is fundamentally connected with what can be counted (see also, Allen, 1999). In the context of local crime audits this pretty much means recorded
crime figures. Actually, corporate crime and some forms of state crime can be counted. Although comparable forms of knowledge around crimes of the powerful are undoubtedly under-developed, it may be the case that corporate and state crime is already be counted using the same techniques deployed in the local auditing process. For example, precisely the same GIS data techniques are applied effectively to identify pollution 'hotspots' by the Environment Agency and by other monitoring organisations (see the Factory Watch pages at [http://www.foe.org.uk](http://www.foe.org.uk/)). Indeed, this data may be much more effective in identifying the prevalence and distribution of corporate harms and illegalities from fixed locations, as opposed to the rather pointless reproduction of the unavoidably contingent, temporal landscapes of local 'conventional' crime patterns.

This problem of visibility is not simply related to the promotion of particular crime sciences per se. It is also a product of rapidly changing forms of democratic accountability and local democracy. The methods of consultation undertaken by most crime and disorder partnerships provides us with a strong indication that as interest in local council elections plummet, focus group and questionnaire democracy is a model which is gaining currency in local politics. It is a distinctly neo-liberal model that reconstructs the voter as customer; the citizen as consumer of government. It is a model that is therefore as concerned with participants' perceptions of the delivery of crime control and their satisfaction with local statutory agencies as much as any other measurable output. As we have already seen, this model of democracy also can be understood as a self-fulfilling exercise, where questionnaires set up rather predictable, even tailored, responses on questions of local priority. In this sense, focus group/questionnaire democracy may actually be more concerned, in a very direct sense, with providing the rationale for pre-ordained strategies and for measuring the legitimacy of local state agents than establishing new forms of popular accountability, or imaginative responses to community safety. The promise of 'nothing ruled in, nothing ruled out' appears nonsensical in the context of the consistently narrow framework of indicators and questionnaire prompts that have actually been used in local audits.

The evidence presented here suggests that knowledge production in newly emerging local partnerships is laying a formidable ideological and practical foundation for the cementing of relations between local and national state structures (see also [Coleman et al., 2002]). Contrary to the claims of current governmentality theorists ([Barry et al., 1996; Rose, 1999]) this is not simply a rule by moral or ethicopolitics. The government of crime control in the UK relies more than ever before upon the administrative apparatuses of a centralised state that are continually engaged in a net-widening exercise ([Cohen, 1979]). The state's ability to organise crime control agendas in a very direct way, linking the activities of crime control partnerships directly to an auditing process which carefully ensures that despite the rhetorics of transparency, partnership and 'what works', the organisation of crime and disorder agendas has proceeded with a remarkable uniformity. The result is the reproduction of criminal justice exclusively for relatively powerless offenders, for the criminal 'other'.

Whilst this paper has explored the invisibility of crimes of the powerful as a result of the process of constructing of valid criminological knowledge, this is not simply a self-contained disciplinary weakness in criminology. As this paper has indicated, the production of academic knowledge is mediated by political decision making, by the changing configuration of research funding, and by wider trends in the labour market and in the economy. When it comes to researching and producing knowledge of corporate and state crime, those mediating factors are of no less significance. Indeed, they may be of rather more significance.

Attracting business has become a central dynamic behind the local political strategies of urban centres. Thatcherite trickle-down economics remains dominant in local economic strategy. It has a different language now: for "trickle down", read "cascading"; for "privatisation" read "public-private partnership"; but the premise is basically the same. The neo-liberal ideal places absolute faith in inward investment into city centre and business park areas as the only means of wealth and job creation. Providing favourable conditions for businesses to relocate: subsidies, public investment in business infrastructure and so on is the only route to economic development. It is a strategy that has been followed fairly uniformly in all of the UK's urban centres. It is a strategy that also enhances social and moral credibility of business and at the same time undermines the case for regulating corporations ([Snider, 2000; Tombs, 2001]). Rarely is it recognised in local government discourse that huge benefits have accrued to business as part of regeneration and inward investment programmes. In so far as neo-liberal ideologies have been relatively successful in simultaneously promoting 'burdens on business' and 'red tape' dogma ([Pearce and Tombs, 1998]), the promotion of
business as the lifeblood of the local economy has progressively weakened the case for regulation, and the control of corporate crime (Snider, 2003). It is a position that is indicative of the current government’s modified structural dependence thesis which feeds a politics of business accommodation (Hay, 1999). In this sense, Home Office research on the business contribution to crime control discussed earlier in this paper is reinforced by a government world view which obscures from sight the possibility that businesses might actually commit crimes. The responsibilisation of business in the realm of crime control on one hand encourages the designing- and managing-out of crimes that attack profits, and, on the other hand, corrals privately owned and commercially distributed technical expertise into the work of partnerships.

Conclusions

In those contexts, particularly, it is perhaps less likely that local authorities, for whom attracting inward investment is a mainstream activity, are likely to challenge or criminalise the very same firms who invest in the area. In a strictly determinist sense, neither may we expect the state to investigate or prosecute its own crimes, because to do so may generate, uncover and amplify problems of legitimacy. But it remains the case that at particular moments a key source of the local state’s claim to (class) neutrality is that it appears to deal with powerful offenders effectively. This is also discernible (although only just) in the current government’s proposals on corporate manslaughter which gained pace after the successful high profile campaigning of the families and survivors of a serious of corporate mass-killings (for example, Herald of Free Enterprise, Piper Alpha, and a long line of rail disasters (Tombs and Whyte, 2003b)). If there is to be space made for an alternative knowledge in crime reduction agendas, then it is much more likely to be made in contexts where the local and national state is vulnerable to counter-hegemonic opposition.

It is worth reiterating that this paper has been concerned with highly visible categories of unambiguous law-breaking. In this sense, it has admittedly avoided discussing how we might approach the most pressing task of all: a full excavation of the ‘dark figure’ of environmental crime. We are not even close to knowing about the full scale of crimes and harms described here as ‘environmental’. Given that even the most elementary (the most serious and obvious) of those crimes remain completely absent from partnership agendas, the prospects for including the full range of those to be accounted for in local criminological knowledge building are slim. Community safety agendas have, for example, nothing to say about the origins of the 10,000-20,000 government estimated deaths brought forward by pollution every year in the UK. In this context the lacuna produced by current ‘inclusive’ crime prevention agendas is stunning.

The strongest voices of opposition to corporate crime at the moment certainly do not come from academic or administrative criminologists. The force for change in the criminalisation of powerful offenders is driven from outside criminology, in the communities and amongst the populations most afflicted by those crimes. In the Mersey Basin, Communities Against Toxins (CATS) has emerged as a strong voice of local awareness-raising around the environmental threats posed by the chemical industries. The same group campaigns for improvements in the legal framework governing pollution offences. In Sellafield, local campaigners in groups such as Cumbrians Opposed to a Radioactive Environment (CORE) have consistently brought abnormally high rates of child leukaemia (Allis-Smith, 1999), the safety record of the plant (for example, CORE Briefing, 07/02) and indeed criminal convictions of BNFL (for example, CORE Briefing, 11/01 and 04/02) within reach of the national media spotlight. Recently those activists were involved in supporting the case brought against BNFL by Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace over the controversial re-opening of their MOX plant (Ananova, 7th December, 2001). Similarly, campaigning organisations representing beach users have sought to force local and central government to take action to clean up their beaches. Indeed, it was a community group, ‘Save Our Shoreline’ (SOS) who in the 1980s were successful in a landmark European Court of Justice prosecution against the British government for their failure to keep 11 beaches on the Fylde coast below the imperative standard for bacteria contamination.

It is precisely these types of activity that deserve the attention of criminology (see also South, 1998; and Slapper and Tombs, 1999). Indeed, at face value, the knowledge and experience
developed by those groups still strikes a chord with Home Office community safety discourses: “Residents groups can provide the foundation for community-based crime prevention measures, particularly in areas where more traditional forms of police/community liaison, such as Neighbourhood Watch, may be difficult to implement.” (Home Office, 1998: 2.32) By any standard, groups such as SOS, CORE and CATS are precisely the type of organisations, whether in terms of contributing to community safety strategies or crime reduction, would bring a unique and important expertise to crime and disorder partnerships. Whether or not such groups do feature in mainstream structures or criminological discourse in the future, they will continue to bring to light alternative sources and forms of knowledge, disseminate alternative criminal justice discourses, and seek to use the full force of the law against those who threaten their communities. Criminologists who do not wish to disappear, as Nicolaus put it, “behind the line of truncheons” would do well to reflect upon the current enterprise of their profession, and the ever narrowing road it follows. In this respect, if we are serious about promoting ‘community safety’, we could do much worse than to refocus the narrow gaze of criminological enterprise onto the crimes and safety threats systematically produced in our own backyards by states and corporations.

Notes

1 See the results of a survey conducted by the Social Work and Social Policy Learning and Teaching Network published at http://www.swap.ac.uk/swap/survey/SPHoDs3.asp
2 Witness the establishment of joint Criminology and Sociology degree in the past 4 years in Sociology departments across the country, including those for example, at Salford University, the University of Liverpool and Manchester Metropolitan University.
3 Personal communication with Home Office RDS, 23rd October, 2000 and 16th July 2002. This budget does not include money allocated for criminal justice related research by Home Office departments other than RDS, for example, Prison Service, asylum, immigration and mental health system related research. This later category of non-RDS Home Office research totaled £10,900,000 in 2001/02 (personal communication with Home Office RDS, 16th July 2002).
4 This figure does not include the Annual Criminal Statistics Publications and Supplementary tables produced by the Home Office, or other statistical publications listed as “miscellaneous”.
5 The same provisos apply (as noted in footnote above).
6 Under the CDA, the responsible authorities are the local authority and the police. Other mandatory partners are listed as the Probation Service and Health Authorities. The Health and Safety Executive is only recommended in the guidance as a suggested member.
7 The Government Office Region for the North West of England is bordered on the west by the Lancashire and Cumbrian coasts, on the North by the Scottish border, on the east by the Lancashire border, taking in Cheshire and stopping at the Welsh border on the south.
8 All audits and strategy documents referred to in the following two sections of the paper are held centrally in the Government Office for the North West Region. Each of those documents must, under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 be made available for public consultation by each local authority. All documents referred to have a publication date of 2002.
9 The issues included here are those for which strategies identified a measurable target. The data is drawn from a database held in the Government Office for the North West Region which is, in turn derived from the pro forma returns to the Government Office and published crime and disorder strategies. The partnerships sampled and included for analysis in Table 1 are the 26 (from a total of 42 North West) partnerships included in the Government Office database (obtained by personal communication, 12 July, 2002).
10 Those are the three issues which tend to appear in government publications on crime reduction. Former Home Secretary Jack Straw’s foreword to the Crime Reduction Strategy, for example, singles these three issues out.
11 Those ‘missing’ issues are Fire Safety, Fear of Crime and Robbery (see Phillips et al, 2000).
12 This assessment of compliance is made by the UK Environment Agency. Other monitoring organisations point out that the total number of EU non-compliant beaches is likely to be much higher for three main reasons: first, the Environment Agency does not publish complete results of all pathogens, second, due to a lack of adequate testing frequency, and third,
because many beaches remain completely untested for some pathogens. (see North Sea Action Group, 2002).

Six of the top ten carcinogen producing factories in the UK are located in the Mersey basin. Those 6 factories alone account for 56% of the UK total of factory produced carcinogens (see the Factory Watch site at http://www.foe.org.uk/).

CORE Briefing is available online at (http://www.kare-uk.org/).

The UK’s third highest producer of carcinogens is the Glaxo plant in Barrow-in-Furness (Factory Watch site at http://www.foe.org.uk/)

The publication of Wirral’s audit was delayed as a result of the death of the local authority community safety officer. A summary supplied by the Government Office for the North West Region has been used instead for this analysis.

The standard mortality rate is an indicator of mortality in a particular area, weighted to account for age differences in comparison populations

See also the Borough of Copeland Audit which includes a three page section with time-analysis and GIS plotting of police data on road accidents.

Figures calculated from data supplied by Government Office for the North West Region (obtained by personal communication, 12 July, 2002).

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This paper is part of a long-term collaborative project on the production of criminological knowledge. Other work in this project includes ‘All that Glitters Isn’t Gold’ (in volume 5, Crime Prevention and Community Safety); Unmasking the Crimes of the Powerful: scrutinising states and corporations, (Peter Lang, 2003; with Steve Tombs); Leaving a Stain on the Silence (unpublished paper, available from author; with Paddy Hillyard, Joe Sim and Steve Tombs).

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