

British Society of Criminology Newsletter

Number 85, Summer 2020

ISSN 1759-8354



Editor

Lizzie Seal

Inside

Times of Crisis

Contributions from: Chantelle A. Cummings, Leah Cleghorn, Jo Roberts, Jennifer Fleetwood, John Lea and Esmorie Miller.

Plus various other items from the BSC

British Society of Criminology

10 Queen Street Place,
London
EC4R 1BE

Email:
info@britsoccrim.org
Web: www.britsoccrim.org
Reg. Charity No. 1073154
© 2020 BSC

Contents

Editorial – <i>Lizzie Seal</i>	4
Themed articles	
COVID-19: A Positive Result for Online Recruitment to Extremist Organizations <i>Chantelle A. Cummings</i>	7
Domestic Violence and Access to Justice during COVID 19 in Trinidad and Tobago: Responses to domestic violence during crisis by the courts and its implications for access <i>Leah Cleghorn</i>	12
Crises Colliding: COVID-19 and domestic abuse <i>Jo Roberts</i>	19
De-funding the Police in the UK <i>Jennifer Fleetwood and John Lea</i>	25
Moving Beyond Crime and Punishment Narratives and Analyses: Critical Race Theory and Racial Specificity in Youth Justice <i>Esmorie Miller</i>	36
Obituary – Professor Roger Matthews	44
Obituary – Professor Peter Rushton	46

Obituary – Professor David Bayley	47
Obituary – Professor Douglas Sharp	49
Regional and Network Events	51
Executive Board 2020-21	53

Editorial

Lizzie Seal, *Chair of the BSC Publications Committee*

The British Society of Criminology's 2020 conference, 'Global Injustice', was due to take place at University of Liverpool in July. It was replaced with online events, most of which were recorded, such as discussion panels, podcasts, award presentations and an online poster competition, see the BSC website:

britsoccrim.org/conference/global-injustice/

The theme for the summer 2020 newsletter is 'times of crisis'. In the midst of the Covid-19 pandemic, we are living through a global health crisis that in some measure affects us all, but is profoundly unequal in its impact along axes of age, race, poverty and gender. This social harm is of direct concern to criminologists, as is the imposition of new regulations and forms of control - including when and to whom these are applied. The summer of Covid-19 has also been a summer of protest against anti-black racism led by Black Lives Matter, initially in the United States catalysed by the killing of George Floyd by a white police officer in May, but also travelling around the world. These protests have foregrounded long-standing issues of structural racism, and the place of policing and prison in sustaining white supremacy.

The articles in this issue of the newsletter were submitted in response to the theme of crisis and as such range across different dimensions. Chantelle Cummings considers how the combination of rising global unemployment due to the pandemic, coupled with increased time spent online, might result in greater online recruitment to extremist organisations. Leah Cleghorn examines mechanisms to enable domestic violence victims' access to the courts in Trinidad and Tobago during Covid-19, especially as such victims already faced barriers when accessing justice. She argues reforms must be victim-centred and gender sensitive. With a focus largely on the UK, Jo Roberts explains that lockdown restrictions provided new ways for abusers to exert coercive control and put women and children in increased danger from serious violence at home. At the same time, the pandemic has worsened existing problems of domestic abuse. She concludes that domestic abuse cannot be solved solely via

the criminal justice system, but requires multi-sector working. Jennifer Fleetwood and John Lea explore the meaning of 'de-funding' the police in the UK context. They discuss a range of possibilities, such as removing the police as the first agency of response in a variety of situations, shrinking the role of the police and enhancing democratic accountability. They argue the defunding movement in the United States raises questions for British criminology. Esmorie Miller offers further food for thought. Drawing on Critical Race Theory, she argues that it is necessary to look beyond the criminal justice system when assessing the perpetuation of racism to incorporate other modern institutions. This enables analysis of how racialised young people have historically been excluded from access to justice - and sounds a note of caution about how significant defunding the police would be in terms of securing racial justice without radical reform across other agencies and institutions.

There are several obituaries in this edition of the newsletter: Roger Matthews, Peter Rushton, David Bayley and Doug Sharp.

Solidarity with everyone dealing with difficulties created, or deepened, by our times.

The logo for the British Society of Criminology (BSC) consists of the letters 'BSC' in a white, serif font, set against a dark blue rectangular background.The text 'British Society of Criminology' is written in a dark blue, serif font on a light purple rectangular background.

Papers from the British Criminology Conference 2021

An Online Journal Published by the British Society of Criminology since 1995
ISSN 1759-0043

If you will be presenting a paper at next year's conference the British Society of Criminology would welcome submissions to the 2021 edition of the online journal based on your conference presentation. We welcome contributions from Plenary Papers, Panel Papers and Postgraduate Papers. All submissions are peer-reviewed. The final deadline for submissions is two months after the end of the conference - 7 September 2021. The journal will be published in December 2021.

The journal is available free at: <http://www.britsoccrim.org/publications/pbcc/>

Please submit your paper via email to info@britsoccrim.org

The small print

Only papers presented at this year's British Society of Criminology annual conference will be accepted for review. Please indicate the category of paper (plenary, panel, or postgraduate paper). Papers must be written in English and will not have been published already, nor will they be under consideration elsewhere. All papers are reviewed anonymously by at least two referees. Each paper should come with a separate cover sheet containing: the title of the paper; word count; author's full name; affiliation; email address; institutional address; telephone and fax number; an abstract of 100-150 words; up to 5 key words; and a brief biographical note of 25-50 words. The maximum length is 6000 words, including notes and references. Articles must be submitted electronically to the BSC in Microsoft Word (or compatible format), typed in double spacing throughout, and with generous margins on all sides. All pages should be numbered. A maximum of three orders of heading can be used. Essential notes should be kept to a minimum. These should be indicated by superscript numbers in the text and presented at the end of the text. Lengthy quotations should be kept to a minimum. If over 40 words these should be indented, with shorter quotes kept within the body of the text indicated by quotation marks. Where possible, the page number for each quote should be indicated. Tables and Figures should be clearly presented and labelled. Sources and explanatory notes should be included if appropriate. Poor quality artwork will be rejected. Papers should be carefully checked for errors before submission. Authors are responsible to the accuracy of quotations and references, and for obtaining permissions and copyright clearances if appropriate. The Harvard-style referencing system is used within the text – for example, (Hughes, 2007) – with an alphabetical "References" list at the end (typed and double-spaced).

Themed articles

COVID-19: A Positive Result for Online Recruitment to Extremist Organizations

Chantelle A. Cummings, The University of Trinidad and Tobago

Infamous violent extremist organizations such as Al-Qaeda, Boko Haram, Al Shabaab and most recently the Islamic State (ISIS) have been known to use a variety of methods to encourage recruitment (Bloom, 2017). While many methods of recruitment are used such as face to face recruitment by members of these extremist groups, family members who have joined the groups and members of the Islamic worshipping community who support the ideologies of engaging in violent extremism, online recruitment is perhaps less known but certainly utilized (Mahood and Rane, 2017). Besides the purporting of an idealist Islamic society by these violent extremist organizations as the main argument to lure new members, they have been well known to provide recruits with handsome weekly monetary rewards or the promise of a financially secure future for their families (Speckhard and Yayla, 2015)

The rapid global spread of the novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) has threatened worldwide economies (Atkeson, 2020) which may have propelled many individuals to frequently use the internet. Unemployment rates have skyrocketed globally (Coibion, Gorodnichenko and Weber, 2020) and more persons may turn to social media and other networking sites either to seek new employment opportunities or as an escape from the daunting realities of being unemployed at such a critical time in the world's history. For some, joining an extremist organization could signal the start of a positive future after the effects of COVID-19. Can the economic fallout predicated by COVID-19 propel individuals to join extremist organizations? This article seeks to examine the very real possibility of this from two criminological perspectives; the Rational Choice Theory and the Routine Activities Theory (RAT).

The Rational Choice Theory purported by Cornish and Clark (1987) postulates that individuals are propelled into criminal activities based on a rational choice that they make. This choice can be based on beliefs, rewards, self interests and the "invisible hand" which is likened to one's moral values. Persons join extremist organizations for much of these same rationalized reasons (Hunter, Shortland, Crayne and Ligon, 2017). The propensity to join these organizations may increase even more during the COVID 19 pandemic based on the sole purpose of rewards. The use of digital technologies enhances the ease of online recruitment especially since lockdown and stay at home measures were enforced by several governments around the world in

an effort to curb the spread of the disease. The use of networking sites has increased significantly as reported by popular search engines during the COVID 19 pandemic and this increase is not limited to nations of the developed world but also those of the developing world (Effenberger, Kronbichler, Shin, Mayer, Tilg, and Perco, 2020). One of the most reported search categories during this global pandemic occurs on job seeking sites (Beirne, Doorley, Regan, Roantree, and Tuda, 2020). This may be an avenue for online recruitment to extremist organizations as desperation for financial security may take precedence over morality.

Sustainable and diversified world economies though faced with the same challenges as weaker ones would perhaps be better able to withstand the pressures of predicted long term unemployment rates due to the measures implemented to decrease the spread of this novel, deadly disease. While citizens of these countries are at risk of falling prey to online recruitment, the real threat lies within countries that have fewer strategies in place to sustain economies. These individuals may become the prime targets of violent extremist organizations as these organizations may paint the picture that they are providing hope in a hopeless situation in the name of Islam (Berribi, 2009). From a psychological perspective, the innate need that individuals possess to become part of something while providing for their families drives the rational choice of some to join these extremist organizations. The economic fallout of COVID 19 could very well be considered a push factor and indeed a rational choice for persons considering joining these extremist organizations, made simple through the use of strategic online recruitment.

Online recruitment to violent extremist organizations have reportedly pivoted on the use of particular online games, searched sites and social media posts by individuals who may have an interest in joining but have not yet fully decided to join as well as those who may not have an interest in joining (Chang, 2015). Likened to scouts searching for the next remarkably talented football player, violent extremist organizations have members monitor the players of online games and the types of games that they play, internet sites visited and social media posts of persons who they deem as being possible recruits. The frequency and relative consistency at which persons engage in particular online games, visit certain internet sites and express their views which relate to moving away from societal norms may be considered as their routines in the virtual world.

The Routine Activities Theory (RAT) postulated by Cohen and Felson (1979) is another theoretical perspective that can be used in an attempt to examine the relationship between online recruitment to violent extremist organizations and the increased usage of the internet because of the COVID 19 pandemic. The global economic downturn has certainly caused more frequent internet usage and what were perhaps seen as leisure activities have now become part of individuals' new normal or more specifically, part of their routines.

These new, or in some cases, overindulgent routines follow the trajectory of what the extremist organization's recruitment agents may consider as suitable targets, a

motivated offender and the lack of capable guardians. These three aforementioned elements form the basis of the RAT (Cohen and Felson, 1979). Suitable targets for these recruiters may be individuals who have lost their main source of income and have begun to frequent various gaming and networking sites; those who have not lost their income but now work for reduced salaries and have more time to spend on the internet; young persons who have been unable to attend school because of COVID 19 restrictions and those who are opposed to the new rules put in place by leaders and use social media to vent their frustrations. COVID 19 is responsible for these four categories of individuals being spread out across the globe and as such, it means that online recruiters for violent extremist organizations have a very large pool of possible persons to recruit.

Members of these violent extremist organizations whose job is to recruit persons are motivated to do so for a plethora of reasons (Bakker, and De Bont, 2016). Researchers speculate that reasons for persons joining violent extremist organizations are money and forming a utopian Islamic society. What is certain is that whatever the rationale and justification used there are several thousand persons who joined and will continue to join these violent extremist organizations.

The economic tailspin that COVID 19 has caused globally can perhaps be seen as a positive result for recruiters to violent extremist organizations. This may indeed be the main driving force behind getting individuals who frequent particular internet sites and gaming rooms to join their organizations. Some recruiters to violent extremist organizations may be even more motivated now to get new members than before because of the loss of control over cities and the numbers of fighters who are either imprisoned or have been killed. The increase in internet usage and traffic to certain sites make a clear path for recruitment to take place. These motivated offenders of violent extremist organizations may take advantage of the routine activities of individuals and try their utmost best to entice them to join. The true success rate of these motivated offenders who are recruiters for violent extremist organizations can and will only be measured if there are notable increases in their violent extremist activities globally in the coming months and even years.

The final element of the RAT is what is considered as the lack of a suitable guardian. In the context of this paper, the lack of a suitable guardian means malfunctioning or out of date anti-virus computer software or simply ignorance of the possibility of being recruited to a violent extremist organization while playing a game and being promised money for services that are made to sound rational and idealistic. The lack of a suitable guardian may also be taken literally as there may be limited parental supervision of teenagers while they interact in cyberspace even more now during the COVID 19 pandemic than previously. Recruiters for these violent extremist organizations are highly skilled professionals who are trained to infiltrate computer software and put their recruitment skills to work when contact is made. During the COVID 19 pandemic, it is entirely possible that virtual recruitment to violent extremist organizations have increased significantly based solely on the many facets of the lack of suitable guardians.

The COVID 19 pandemic has undoubtedly wreaked havoc in a variety of ways. One of the most obvious and damaging is based on economic changes that have occurred and will continue to occur in the near future. Rising economic concerns such as job losses and decreases in salaries may result in persons finding alternative ways to support themselves and their families. What may have seemed farfetched and not a reality for some may become their new normal if recruiters to violent extremist organizations use technological tools to successfully lure new members to join these groups. Based on the arguments put forward and supported by the two theoretical perspectives, the Rational Choice Theory and the Routine Activities Theory, the economic fallout predicated by the COVID 19 pandemic and the advantage of this taken by online recruiters to these violent extremist organizations can indeed cause persons to join. While most of the world reels from the effects of COVID 19, positive results are possible for recruiters to these extremist organizations. Only time will tell the effects of COVID 19 on the success rate of online recruitment to violent extremist organizations.

References

- Atkeson, A. (2020) What will be the economic impact of covid-19 in the US? Rough estimates of disease scenarios (No. w26867). *National Bureau of Economic Research*.
- Bakker, E., & De Bont, R. (2016) Belgian and Dutch jihadist foreign fighters (2012–2015): Characteristics, motivations, and roles in the War in Syria and Iraq. *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 27(5): 837-857.
- Beirne, K., Doorley, K., Regan, M., Roantree, B., & Tuda, D. (2020) The potential costs and distributional effect of Covid-19 related unemployment in Ireland. *Budget Perspectives*, 2021.
- Berrebi, C. (2009) The Economics of Terrorism and Counterterrorism: What Matters and Is Rational-Choice Theory Helpful? *Social science for counterterrorism: Putting the pieces together*, 151-208.
- Bloom, M. (2017) Constructing expertise: Terrorist recruitment and “talent spotting” in the PIRA, Al Qaeda, and ISIS. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 40(7): 603-623.
- Chang, M. D. (2015) Trolling new media: violent extremist groups recruiting through social media. *NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA*.
- Cohen, L. E., & Felson, M. (1979) Social change and crime rate trends: A routine activity approach. *American sociological review*, 588-608.
- Coibion, O., Gorodnichenko, Y., & Weber, M. (2020) Labor markets during the covid-19 crisis: A preliminary view (No. w27017). *National Bureau of Economic Research*.

Cornish, D. B., & Clarke, R. V. (1987) Understanding crime displacement: An application of rational choice theory. *Criminology*, 25(4): 933-948.

Effenberger, M., Kronbichler, A., Shin, J. I., Mayer, G., Tilg, H., & Perco, P. (2020) Association of the COVID-19 pandemic with internet search volumes: a google trends analysis. *International Journal of Infectious Diseases*.

Hunter, S. T., Shortland, N. D., Crayne, M. P., & Ligon, G. S. (2017) Recruitment and selection in violent extremist organizations: Exploring what industrial and organizational psychology might contribute. *American Psychologist*, 72(3): 242.

Mahood, S., & Rane, H. (2017) Islamist narratives in ISIS recruitment propaganda. *The Journal of International Communication*, 23(1): 15-35.

Speckhard, A., & Yayla, A. S. (2015) Eyewitness accounts from recent defectors from Islamic State: Why they joined, what they saw, why they quit. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 9(6): 95-118.

Domestic Violence and Access to Justice during COVID 19 in Trinidad and Tobago: Responses to domestic violence during crisis by the courts and its implications for access

Leah Cleghorn, The University of Trinidad and Tobago

The declaration of COVID-19 as a global health pandemic by the World Health Organization (WHO) altered lives globally. Many have been subject to stringent 'stay at home' orders which ensure limited movement to slow the spread of the virus. As more persons stayed in-doors across the globe, there was a marked increase in the reporting of domestic violence cases internationally (Taub, 2020; Usher et al., 2020). In Trinidad and Tobago there was a drastic rise in domestic violence reports, in March 2019 reports numbered 42; compared to March 2020, there were 203 reports (Ramdass, 2020). The increase in domestic violence reports may be the result of social isolation, a central feature of the public health response to the pandemic but also a feature of coercive control (Stark, 2013; Usher et al., 2020). This forced social isolation enabled abusers to use the stay at home orders to further traumatize their victims. Moreover, it meant victims were cut off from sources of assistance, unable to communicate privately with supportive networks such as extended family or friends or community-based networks or access shelters and other outreach programs (Usher et al., 2020). This also meant that advocacy groups, support services as well as the criminal justice system, needed to find alternative measures to assist victims to escape their situations (*COVID-19 and Ending Violence Against Women and Girls*, n.d.).

While some victims can make a police report, their journey through justice does not end after making a report but includes access to the courts for the application for protection orders and hearings at the court. During this crisis, most jurisdictions deemed their courts an essential service, and consequently these institutions were required to adjust their operations to work in a world where social distancing and limited social contact are the new norm. This analysis seeks to explore the measures

implemented in Trinidad and Tobago in response to the needs of domestic violence victims during this time of crisis and the possible challenges such victims may encounter. Through a review of COVID-19 directives and practice directions for court operations, I undertake a brief discussion on their possible impact on victims accessing justice during the crisis and its association to the barriers they experienced pre-pandemic.

The criminal justice system in Trinidad and Tobago reflects its colonial past, and in some fashion mimics the processes and procedures of the criminal justice system in the United Kingdom. The Judiciary, as the third independent arm of the State established by the Constitution comprises the Supreme Court of Judicature and the Magistracy, and is responsible for the timely resolution of legal disputes between individuals and bodies including the state and promoting access to justice (*The Judiciary of Trinidad and Tobago: About the Judiciary: Overview*, n.d.). More importantly, the system is required to facilitate people who find themselves in a state of “brokenness”. For victims of domestic violence, it serves as a last line of defense that protects them from their abuser. In the court, victims can make an application for a protection order and obtain other legal support services to assist in helping with their situations.

The system, however, is characterized by physical interaction in centralized locations at city centers and towns, face to face exchanges and a high turnover of handling physical documents is often critiqued as archaic, bureaucratic as well as dysfunctional (Greenberg and Agozino, 2012). This is exemplified in victims’ applications for protection orders which require the victim or applicant to physically interact with the court and its representatives. The application requires the victim or applicant to go to the court’s registry at the respective Magistrate’s court; speak to the Clerk of the Peace to identify the problem and determine if it is domestic violence matter or a matter for another court. If it is decided, the victim (applicant) pays TTD\$3.00 in cash or this value in stamps for filing a domestic violence complaint and a complaint and summons are prepared with a fixed date of hearing seven days after filing the application. After the complaint is signed, the victim or applicant takes the summons to be served on the respondent to the police or may be served by the applicant or his/her agent (*The Judiciary of Trinidad and Tobago: Public Guidance: FAQ’s: Magistrates’ Court: Domestic Violence*, n.d.). However, the occurrence of COVID-19 meant the closing of courtrooms, the limiting of in-house services and

operations by the courts, the suspension of trials and delays in justice which affects victims already awaiting protection orders and hearings and those seeking access to justice.

The response of the Judiciary was the use of technology to replace certain services and operations and digitalization of services to administer justice. In its earliest practice directions by the Judiciary, domestic violence cases (matters) were amongst the few matters deemed fit for hearing in any event during this period. However, all in-person appearances were discouraged, with Judges, Masters, Magistrates, Supreme Court Registrars and Magistracy Registrars being encouraged to use telephonic or video technology for all hearings (*Revised Practice Direction - COVID-19. Emergency Directions as Stated in Gazette No.31, n.d.*). The latest practice direction issued by the Judiciary provided the option of in-person and electronic hearings for some matters, with domestic violence matters being mentioned. It reflects the opinion that in such matters the interest of justice can be compromised by an electronic hearing and therefore should be conducted in person. However, in keeping with the need to maintain appropriate health and safety requirements the practice directions stipulated that these matters such as domestic violence matters are encouraged to be conducted by electronic means as far as possible. Additionally, the Judiciary in its direction encouraged the electronic filing of documents. For self-represented members of the public and persons with no other means to file electronically, documents are to be filed via the electronic filing kiosks available at centralized locations (urban centers) (*Practice Direction, Court Operations COVID-19 Pandemic Directions with effect from June 16 2020, No. 4, pp.788-791*). Additionally, applications for a protection order could be made at the available Family Courts and Magistrates Courts with a specific email and contact number for domestic violence.

The implementation of 'stay at home orders' as well as the suspension and limiting of services and operations by the court complicates victims' ability access justice services. The limited physical access to courts and its services curtails victim's ability to make applications for protection orders, or even leave the homes they share with their abusers. The reduction in days and times of operation led to a reduced opportunity for face to face cases being heard, also limiting the victim's ability to be heard. Consequently, victims and those who assist them are required to find ways to make applications and attend hearings (virtual or face to face) that will not hamper their safety. Additionally, the nature of the pandemic altered our modes of interaction

from physical to virtual, the increased use of technology and virtual communication can impact access for domestic violence victims. In some places, especially rural communities, victims may not have access to a mobile phone, computer, or internet to access services or be able to safely use these at home as they may be closely monitored by the perpetrator and other family members. Such limitations to access are also heightened in situations where officers are given the authority to assess whether removing the victim from the home serves in the best interest of all parties (Ramdass, 2020). Consequently, victims may be unable to make the applications for orders electronically or attend electronic hearings. While it seems the court attempted to provide victims with priority access, the current pandemic adds to some of the barriers victims faced pre-pandemic.

Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic domestic violence victims faced institutional barriers when accessing justice. For many their experiences with court processes such as the application for protection orders and other forms of legal protection was traumatizing and intimidating. Lazarus-Black (2007, pp. 91-118) elucidates that this intimidation stems from the listener(s) in the courtroom, usually the judge holding physical, social, psychological, and economic power over the victim and as such creates an environment of intimidation. Moreover, magistrates and judges at times lack a clear understanding of the dynamics of victims' abuse and the risk exposure to victims and their dependents (Meyer, 2011). Judges also determine the kind of attention paid to domestic violence and could determine which matters should be subject to legal redress (Douglas, 2012; us, 1986; Weissman, n.d.). Other barriers in the court relate to delays in justice as victims' hearings for protection orders can take some time although it is stipulated that such applications are to be heard in seven days. Such delays have resulted in approximately 8000 protection orders before the courts. These delays may be due to adjournments resulting from the lack of available magistrates (Gopaulchan, 2020). These pre-pandemic and potential pandemic related issues faced by domestic violence victims are reflective of the lack of a gendered approach when creating strategy to deal with their access to justice needs.

COVID-19 has created a challenge for the operation of the criminal justice system. In Trinidad and Tobago, the decision to go virtual and digitized in short manner demonstrates a willingness to reform. However, the pandemic has contributed to a greater burden on an already burdened system. More importantly, there is a need for a more comprehensive and gendered strategy to ensure that victims of domestic

violence can co-exist with the protocols of COVID-19. This pandemic presents an opportunity for the courts and the wider criminal justice system to consider reforms that allow for the implementation of victim-centered solutions. Such solutions should focus on training of court workers and judges on the needs of this victim group and thereby improve social and cultural attitudes towards domestic violence victimization. Additionally, consideration should be given to reforming the processes and procedures that may be too complicated for victims and ensuring that orders and hearings are quick and accessible. This may include the decentralization of certain services that would make applications for orders and other services more accessible to victims that may lack resources or live in rural communities. The pandemic has demonstrated the ability of the court to adapt and therefore there is hope for reform.

References

COVID-19 and Ending Violence against women and girls (2020) *UN Women*.

<https://www.unwomen.org/-/media/headquarters/attachments/sections/library/publications/2020/issue-brief-covid-19-and-ending-violence-against-women-and-girls-en.pdf?la=en&vs=5006>

Douglas, H. (2012). Battered Women's Experiences of the Criminal Justice System: Decentring the Law. *Feminist Legal Studies*, 20, 121–134.

<https://doi.org/10.1007/s10691-012-9201-1>

Evan Stark (2013). Coercive Control. In N. Lombard, L McMillan (eds) *Violence Against Women: Current Theory and Practice in Domestic Abuse, Sexual Violence and Exploitation* (pp. 17-34). Jessica Kingsley Publishers.

Gopaulchan, B. (2020, April 27). Attorney: Court delays a further threat to domestic violence victims. *Trinidad and Tobago Guardian*.

<http://www.guardian.co.tt/news/attorney-court-delays-a-further-threat-to-domestic-violence-victims-6.2.1105991.389a15bb92>

Greenberg, D.F., and Agozino, B. (2012). Executions, Imprisonment and Crime in Trinidad and Tobago. *British Journal of Criminology*, 52(1), 113-140.

Lazarus-Black, M. (2007). *Everyday harm: Domestic violence, court rites, and cultures of reconciliation*. Urbana, IL: Univ. of Illinois Press.

Meyer, S. (2011). Seeking help for intimate partner violence: Victims' experiences when approaching the criminal justice system for IPV-related support and protection in an Australian jurisdiction. *Feminist Criminology*, 6(4), 268–290.

<https://doi.org/10.1177/1557085111414860>

Ramdass, A. (2020, April 22). Hell at Home: Domestic violence reports skyrocket in March. *Trinidad Express*.

https://trinidadexpress.com/news/local/hell-at-home/article_6a096292-84fe-11ea-8438-a7da4d4403c1.html

Taub, A. (2020, April 6). A New Covid-19 Crisis: Domestic Abuse Rises Worldwide. *The Interpreter*.

<https://chescof.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Domestic-Abuse-Rises-Worldwide-New-York-Times.pdf>

The Judiciary of Trinidad and Tobago: About the Judiciary: Overview. (n.d.). Retrieved July 8, 2020.

<http://www.ttlawcourts.org/index.php/about-the-judiciary-1/overview-53>

The Judiciary of Trinidad and Tobago : Public Guidance : FAQ's : Magistrates' Court : Domestic Violence. (n.d.). Retrieved July 11, 2020.

<http://www.ttlawcourts.org/index.php/public-guidance/faqs/magistrates-court/domestic-violence>

The Judiciary of Trinidad and Tobago: Practice Directions: Supreme Court : Revised Practice Direction - COVID-19. Emergency Directions as stated in Gazette No.31, superseding those carried in Gazette No. 30. (n.d.). Retrieved July 12, 2020.

<http://www.ttlawcourts.org/index.php/rules-a-practice-directions/supreme-court/9533-covid-19-emergency-directions>

Trinidad and Tobago Gazette (Extraordinary) Vol. 59 Caroni, Trinidad, Sunday 14th June, 2020, Practice Direction, Court Operations COVID19 Pandemic Directions with effect from June 16, 2020 (No. 4).

<http://www.ttlawcourts.org/index.php/component/attachments/download/7179>

Usher, K., Bhullar, N., Durkin, J., Gyamfi, N., & Jackson, D. (2020). Family violence and COVID-19: Increased vulnerability and reduced options for support. *International Journal of Mental Health Nursing*, inm.12735. <https://doi.org/10.1111/inm.12735>

Crises Colliding: COVID-19 and domestic abuse

Dr Jo Roberts, University of Bristol

“It’s hell on earth living 24/7 now with my abuser & can’t get out to escape, [to] put distance between us when I feel tension rising.” Survivor quotation (Women’s Aid, 2020a)

In times of crisis our attention focuses upon the issue thrust into the spotlight, in this case the COVID-19 pandemic and the subsequent impact it has had on everyday life across the world. In January 2020, the World Health Organisation (WHO) declared that a virus outbreak had become a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (WHO, 2020b). Only a couple of months later the WHO issued a statement categorising the outbreak of COVID-19 as a pandemic (WHO, 2020c). The latest figures to be released indicate that the number of deaths resultant from the virus have now exceeded half a million worldwide (WHO, 2020a).

As countries across the globe have mobilised to tackle the worldwide outbreak of the virus some actions have been accompanied by negative consequences from which additional crises have stemmed including economic instability, job losses, and of course physical and psychological health risks. However, what about the impact that COVID-19 is having upon other pre-existing phenomena, such as domestic abuse, which in itself should be recognised as a crisis?

Governments across the world have been forced to respond to the pandemic and in many countries the actions taken have included the imposition of lockdowns and enforced restrictions, predominantly urging people to remain at home in order to keep populations safe by attempting to contain the spread of the virus. This approach, however, positions the home as a place of sanctuary and safety, but for those experiencing domestic abuse the home can be the polar opposite. Consequently, the restrictions imposed to reduce the risk of contracting the virus and to protect populations have, in contrast, actually increased risk for some, namely victims of domestic abuse who were already being subjected to another crisis of pandemic proportions.

From the very beginning of the outbreak a wide range of specialist domestic abuse service providers and those researching violence against women and girls (VAWG) have articulated their concerns about the harmful consequences of the lockdown for those experiencing domestic abuse. A VAWG Helpdesk rapid research query report (Fraser, 2020) produced by the Department for International Development, identified increased incidents of domestic abuse in China and Italy during the early stages of the pandemic. Drawing on the situation in Italy, di Redazione (2020) suggested that an increase in domestic abuse incidents may have been contributed to by forced cohabitation, increased economic stress combined with other factors such as home working.

In the UK, Women's Aid (2020b) identified that domestic abuse perpetrators have been employing the rules relating to both social distancing measures and self-isolation as additional tools of coercive control. In addition, Women's Aid suggested that lockdown measures have effectively closed down routes victims can take to access much needed support or to attempt to escape their abusive relationships.

The Welsh Government identified a range of ways in which the lockdown restrictions could affect survivors of domestic abuse including reducing contact survivors are able to have with friends, family and professionals who could monitor their safety. They also suggested that increased stress might contribute to the perpetration of abuse including stress arising from job losses, anxiety over the virus itself and confinement to the home. Perhaps most importantly the Welsh Government (2020) also drew attention to the impact of widespread school closures leading to the increased likelihood of domestic abuse occurring in the presence of children who have been unable to attend school.

In April 2020, Women's Aid conducted a survey, the purpose of which was to monitor and assess the impact that the measures introduced to combat the spread of COVID-19 have had on those experiencing domestic abuse. Of those survivors of domestic abuse who responded to the survey 67.4% reported that their abuse had worsened during the COVID-19 period. Furthermore, over three quarters of the survivors also reported that due to COVID-19 they had been forced to spend more time with their abuser (Women's Aid, 2020a). The survey also highlighted that another consequence of the lockdown measures has been that survivors are finding it more difficult to escape their relationships (Ibid). The report concluded that the

measures imposed to combat COVID-19 had exposed survivors of domestic abuse to worsening levels of victimisation whilst also restricting their access to help. Women's Aid identified that perpetrators of domestic abuse have been utilising the restrictions imposed to suppress the spread of the virus to facilitate further control over their victims as well as using the virus itself as a tool to induce fear. Finally, they also evidenced that the negative impact of COVID-19 and the subsequent actions taken by governments to combat the virus have not been limited to women alone. Children, at home whilst schools have shut, have consequently been exposed to domestic abuse themselves and, furthermore, perpetrators have employed child contact arrangements as another mechanism of abuse.

In the weeks since the lockdown measures were introduced, attention has also been drawn to the numbers of domestic homicides that have taken place during this time. In April 2020 Karen Ingala Smith, who tracks men's fatal violence against women in the UK for The Femicide Census, identified that in the first three weeks of lockdown fourteen women and two children were murdered in domestic homicides (Smith, 2020). Comparing this figure to the number of women's deaths at the hands of men for the last ten years the average number of murders within a three-week period would be expected to reach around seven homicides. Therefore, the deaths of women and children at the hands of their abusers during the first weeks of lockdown were double the hypothetical average of the deaths recorded in the last ten-year period (Ibid).

It is of course imperative to state that coronavirus itself does not create violent men, cause domestic abuse, nor was it responsible for the deaths of those women and children, the perpetrators of the abuse were. What the COVID-19 crisis has exposed, however, are the dangers that women and children are subjected to on a daily basis, something that was not created, but has been exacerbated, by this worldwide crisis. Exploring the impact of COVID-19 on domestic abuse has consequently demonstrated the disproportionate affect the lockdown has had on women and children, resultant from the increased frequency and severity of domestic abuse on a scale that should itself be labelled a public health crisis.

It is not yet possible to present a comprehensive picture of the impact the coronavirus pandemic has had, and continues to have, on survivors of domestic abuse as most of the evidence thus far has been acquired via news and media sources and the perspectives of those working at the frontline of the VAWG sector.

Therefore, what this article presents is an early indication of the evidence that has begun to emerge. Funding has become available to ensure research can be carried out in this area to enable us to capture more detailed information pertaining to the effects of COVID-19 on survivors of domestic abuse.

In summary, the COVID-19 outbreak, a global pandemic, has not only created new crises but also exacerbated existing ones, traversing all sectors including health, education, employment and criminal justice. It could be argued that for survivors of domestic abuse the COVID-19 outbreak should be described as a situation of crises colliding, with the actions taken to address the pandemic and reduce the risk of the spread of the virus has actually increasing the risk for survivors of domestic abuse. Traditionally, responses to tackle domestic abuse have often been confined to criminal justice interventions, which have of course been significantly affected by the pandemic; however, it is also important to recognise the much wider impact of domestic abuse victimisation on women and children including on their health and wellbeing.

It is therefore imperative that we recognise domestic abuse as a continuing criminal justice and public health crisis of pandemic proportions. Domestic abuse is an ongoing crisis that will persist long after a vaccination has been developed for coronavirus, long after medical progress has been made to be able to adequately treat the virus and life begins to return to 'normal' for some people. What should also be considered is the life-threatening nature of domestic abuse, which is evident across the globe. The United Nations identified that in 2017 alone 87,000 women were intentionally killed and 58 percent of these women were killed by family members or intimate partners. This translates to the murder of 137 women, murders perpetrated by women's family members or intimate partners, every day across the world (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2019) and these figures of course do not take into account the other myriad effects that domestic abuse can have upon women and children's lives.

In conclusion, domestic abuse should be viewed as a crisis of pandemic proportions, which needs to be addressed, and eradicated, using a multi-agency, cross-sector response; it is not something that can be resolved via the criminal justice system alone. Responsibility must also be placed upon the root cause of the problem, those

perpetrating abuse. This is in stark contrast to placing the burden of responsibility on survivors and their children to take action to escape or cope with domestic abuse.

Author: Dr Jo Roberts, Senior Research Associate for REPROVIDE: A trial of group programmes for perpetrators of domestic abuse, University of Bristol

<http://www.bristol.ac.uk/group-intervention-for-men>

References

di Redazione (2020) 'Coronavirus, la denuncia di WeWorld: «Donne isolate, molte in compagnia dei maltrattanti»'. Available at:

<http://www.vita.it/it/article/2020/03/12/coronavirusla-denuncia-di-weworld-donne-isolate-molte-in-compagnia-de/154412/> (Accessed 10th July 2020).

Fraser, E. (2020) *Impact of COVID-19 Pandemic on Violence Against Women and Girls*. Available at:

<http://www.sddirect.org.uk/media/1881/vawg-helpdesk-284-covid-19-and-vawg.pdf>

(Accessed 1st July 2020)

Smith, K.I. (2020) *Coronavirus Doesn't Cause Men's Violence Against Women*. Available at:

<https://kareningalasmith.com/2020/04/15/coronavirus-doesnt-cause-mens-violence-against-women/> (Accessed 1st July 2020)

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2019) *Global Study on Homicide 2019*, Vienna: UNODC.

Welsh Government (2020) *Guidance for services for perpetrators of violence against women, domestic abuse and sexual violence: coronavirus (COVID-19)*. Available at:

<https://gov.wales/guidance-services-perpetrators-violence-against-women-domestic-abuse-and-sexual-violence> (Accessed 2nd July 2020)

Women's Aid (2020a) *The impact of Covid-19 on survivors: findings from Women's Aid's initial Survivor Survey*, Bristol: Women's Aid Federation of England.

Women's Aid (2020b) *The impact of COVID-19 on women and children experiencing domestic abuse, and the life-saving services that support them*. Available at:

<https://www.womensaid.org.uk/the-impact-of-covid-19-on-women-and-children-experiencing-domestic-abuse-and-the-life-saving-services-that-support-them/>

(Accessed 2nd July 2020)

World Health Organisation (2020a) *Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic*. Available at:

<https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019> (Accessed 23rd July 2020)

World Health Organisation (2020b) *COVID-19 Public Health Emergency of International Concern Global research and Innovation Forum*. Available at:

[https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/covid-19-public-health-emergency-of-international-concern-\(pheic\)-global-research-and-innovation-forum](https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/covid-19-public-health-emergency-of-international-concern-(pheic)-global-research-and-innovation-forum) Accessed 2nd July 2020)

World Health Organisation (2020c) *Rolling Updates on Coronavirus disease (COVID-19)*. Available at:

<https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/events-as-they-happen> (Accessed 2nd July 2020).

De-funding the Police in the UK

Jennifer Fleetwood and John Lea, Goldsmiths, University of London

De-funding the police involves shifting funds from police budgets towards social services and community-based crime prevention initiatives. As Critical Resistance (2030: 3) articulate, it is a movement to:

... invest in things that actually make our communities safer: quality, affordable, and accessible housing, universal quality health care, including community-based mental health services, income support to stay safe during the pandemic, safe living wage employment, education, and youth programming.

For some, de-funding is a step towards police abolition. For Alex Vitale, a leading US academic supporter of police abolition, "any real agenda for police reform must replace police with empowered communities working to solve their own problems." (2017: 30). Vitale's work builds on what McDowell and Fernandez (2018: 377) describe as 'radical' abolitionist writing. This work (inter alia Chazkel et al. 2002; Gilmore 2007; Davis 2011) understands criminal justice as integral to maintaining racial inequality. Racial justice therefore demands abolishing prisons and police. This work is allied with, but distinct from, European liberal abolitionism (McDowell and Fernandez 2018; Ryan and Ward 2015) which – like British criminology – has struggled to integrate race (Phillips et al. 2019).

In the USA, de-funding advocacy is well established (Williams 2004; Critical Resistance 2009; Kaba 2014; Murakawa 2014; Vitale 2017) but has been invigorated by contemporary Black Lives Matter protests. Indeed, several US cities (where police funding is a city matter) including Minneapolis (Levin 2020), and Baltimore (Hellgren 2020) have been prompted to undertake de-funding initiatives. In Los Angeles, local councillors propose reducing the LAPD budget by 8% (amounting to savings of \$150million) (Los Angeles Times 2020). Seattle looks set to defund their police by half (Associated Press 2020).

In the UK, calls to defund the police are comparatively novel but have support from academics and activists (Abolitionist Futures no date; Duff and Kemp 2020; Elliott-Cooper 2020). The debate has different starting points in the two countries, however.

In the US, de-funding demands confronting expanding police budgets - in Los Angeles police spending has expanded by 58% over the last decade to absorb half the city budget (LA Times 2020). In England and Wales, by contrast, police have been steadily de-funded since the economic crisis of 2009, resulting in about 19,500 fewer police officers (about 14% of 2009 levels) (Home Office 2019b: 4). Moreover, in the UK the balance between police and social services has moved against the latter with police, despite financial restraint, retaining a wide range of prevention and emergency responsibilities previously undertaken by social services (Millie 2014). In part due to massive financial cuts in social services over the last decade, the police are often the only state agency available in a crisis, despite themselves experiencing de-funding.

This 'de-funding from above' has in no way reduced police violence toward Black people in the UK. Since monitoring was introduced in England and Wales in 2017, police use of force has increased by 36%, from 313,000 incidents in 2017/8 to 428,000 in 2018/9 (Home Office 2018, 2019a). Further, they report that use of force against Black people constitutes 16% of the total (Home Office 2019b), despite Black people representing only 3% of the population of England and Wales (ONS 2011). In London, use of Tasers is racially disproportionate (Noor 2018). Black people are also still six times more likely to be searched than white people for drugs (Eastwood et al. 2013) and are more likely to die in police custody (Inquest 2020) for which, since 1969, no officers have been held accountable. The past decade in England and Wales makes clear that disinvestment in police alone is insufficient to reduce violence against Black people.

The language of 'de-funding' has been effective in prompting rapid change in the USA, but if the idea is to gain credence in the UK then it needs to be attuned to our particular institutional arrangements. In the following we take inspiration from BLM and police abolitionism and ask questions about ways forward for police abolition in the UK context. We start with the left realist commitment to take seriously the problems of crime and lack of security; as BLM protests attest, security and safety are highly racialised. Kinsey, Young and Lea's (1986: 205) claim that the state can and should protect us remains apt, despite – or perhaps especially because of – the contemporary context of austerity and neoliberalism.

Shifting the balance

Given the established limitations of the police for managing social problems, it is hardly contentious to argue for social rather than criminal justice responses for a whole range of social problems:

Rough-sleeping, mental health crises, drug and alcohol-related problems, domestic violence, issues relating to Covid-19.... could be far more effectively and humanely addressed by well-funded, community-based emergency support teams, crisis intervention and violence de-escalation workers (Duff and Kemp 2020).

'De-funding' is part of a wider strategy of 'structural reforms' aimed at eliminating the necessity of the police as the agency of first response, and removing their legitimacy as the only institution responsible for social control and security. But, we contend that the state retains responsibility for keeping people safe and maintaining public order, at least in the interim. Given that abolition is a process, we might start by considering if or how police and social services might work together in the interim as producers of social order, as resources and legitimacy move from police to alternatives. To illustrate, domestic violence, could be supported by properly funded urgent social services. Reflecting the shift in power, police may be necessary as backup but acting on the direction of social workers. This kind of response would be better placed to reflect the diverse justice needs of domestic violence survivors (McGlynn and Westmarland 2019). All this would require profound changes in social work as well as police training. Social work must be rescued from its status as a forgotten, and under-resourced emergency service (Allen 2013).

With the aim of shifting the balance, police could withdraw from spheres where there already exist better alternatives, reversing what Andrew Millie (2013) describes as 'policification' - the encroachment of police on issues better handled by other agencies. Disaster management is currently undertaken by police but could arguably be done by the fire brigade, for example (Millie 2014). Police not only enforce school attendance (Millie 2014) but are actually present in schools in England and Wales (Joseph-Salisbury 2020). The case for care rather than punishment is especially compelling in relation to children and young people (Goldson 2005). Clearly a social worker, rather than a police officer, would be better equipped to deal with children in school, including violence on campus (Millie 2014). The criminalisation of children in

care (Scruton and Haydon 2002; Hunter 2019) is also a key site for immediate reforms, especially given that so many are Black and minority ethnic. Under the hostile environment, border control is undertaken in a variety of settings which ought to prioritise duty of care – the NHS, housing, schools and universities. Removing responsibilities to report is essential in rolling back criminalisation of foreign nationals, who are disproportionately of ethnic minority.

Likewise, responsibility for a range of crime problems could be shifted from police to public health. An obvious example here is drug and alcohol related problems where public health approaches focus on reducing harm, as is already happening in Scotland (Scottish Government 2018). In London, the Mayor's office has adopted a public health approach to knife crime, hoping to emulate success in Glasgow. Thus, de-funding can be conceptualised as a shift in resources to public health combined with a residual minimal policing response to these issues.

Yet, despite community problem solving, individual incidents of violence will remain. Some US abolitionists propose these could be solved by "skills-based education on bystander intervention" (8toabolition 2020). Yet, bystander interventions alone place onerous responsibilities on individuals and it is easy to imagine wealthy or even working-class communities with resources outsourcing the task to private security (see Fitzgibbon and Lea 2020). Rather, there needs to be a radical change in the relationship between the public and the police, in which police autonomy is radically curtailed, and in which communities democratically determine policing priorities.

Minimal Policing

Whilst the language of de-funding is new, similar ideas of minimal policing were first developed by Left Realists during the 1980s (see Kinsey, Lea and Young 1986). A key part of minimal policing is to actively reduce police autonomy and radically increase their accountability. Even while maintaining the goal of abolition, radically restricting police powers – rather than merely restricting their resources - is a necessary step. Police respond to calls, period. Further checks on the methods and priorities of police action are provided by channels of democratic accountability reflecting the needs of the local community regarding both police and social service agencies.

Mindful that police use of force is disproportionately against Black people and especially young men, this might be an important starting point for restricting the legitimate use of coercive force. Doing so would acknowledge and seek to remedy the damage wrought by generations of police racism. Gone would be the autonomy of police to decide when and how to intervene in which incidents. Gone also would be forms of policing which have racially disproportionate outcomes. Decades of reform and good intentions since the Scarman Report of 1981 have failed to remove stop and search as the most contentious and unproductive of police practices particularly as regards young Black men. It is singularly unproductive in terms of endearing police to Black communities, or in terms of gathering useful information (Bowling and Phillips 2006; Eastwood et al. 2013 Delso and Shiner 2015). Along with stop and search would go Met Police's controversial gang database (Williams and Clarke 2016) and also the policing of drug consumption which has long provided the police with cover to stop and search young black men. The racialised expansion of surveillance and policing demanded by hostile environment policies (see Parmar 2020) could be abolished with little impact on public safety.

Radically reducing the scope of police powers needs to be accompanied by radical forms of democratic accountability (Kinsey, Young and Lea 1986). Police would respond to, rather than initiate policing campaigns. Information would be in the hands of community groups and social services who would call in police only when other methods of conflict resolution or restorative justice failed or required backup. Police of course already often work with 'multi-agency' teams involving social work, health, education, probation etc. But they frequently see themselves as taking the lead role and guard their decision-making autonomy. Minimal policing would make police the servant of these other agencies, obliged to undertake specific types of action - e.g. arrest or caution - only when directed by other agencies. Such situations may exist in practice from time to time but they are rare and purely the outcome of 'good working relationships' e.g. between police and probation, not a result of statutory requirements.

The UK experience shows that de-funding is insufficient on its own. Thus, we argue that – taking lessons from left realism's idea of minimal policing – de-funding must be accompanied by changes in legal powers and responsibilities both for the police and, importantly, for other social service agencies. It also requires developing radical forms of public and democratic accountability, to which we now turn.

Politics?

De-funding has proven to be an effective campaign strategy in the USA, precisely because city councillors control the budgets for social care and police, and (as described above) and can reallocate funding through voting. This is not the case in the UK where police funding is (mostly) centralised (Broden and Ellison 2013). For de-funding to become more than a grass roots demand in the UK, proponents need to identify where in the current political structure this can happen.

One hope for change might be through the Labour Party. We have not got off to a good start. Sir Keir Starmer, new Labour leader and former Director of Public Prosecutions, told BBC Breakfast (29 June) that calls for de-funding the police were "just nonsense". This actually is not so much a shift to the right than consistent with the Labour manifestos of both 2017 and 2019. Both simply promised to restore cuts in police funding by previous Conservative governments combined with encouragement of police to "work collaboratively with youth workers, mental health services, schools, drug rehabilitation programmes and other public agencies" (Labour Manifesto 2019: 43). This is precisely where the debate needs to start rather than conclude. Kindred concepts such as 'justice reinvestment' (Brown et al. 2016) may be easier for squeamish political leaders to voice. The current government meanwhile says it plans a Royal Commission into the effectiveness of the criminal justice system. It might seem a forlorn hope that the issues raised by BLM will echo in political debate. Yet, as this article hopefully shows, the success of de-funding campaigns in the US pose important questions for British criminology.

References

8toabolition (2020) *Invest in Community Self Governance*.
<https://www.8toabolition.com/invest-in-community-self-governance>

Abolitionist Futures. No date. *For social + transformative justice, against prisons + policing*. <https://abolitionistfutures.com/>

Alexander, M., (2012) *The new Jim Crow: Mass incarceration in the age of colorblindness*. The New Press.

Allen, Ruth (2013) Social workers: the forgotten emergency service. *The Guardian*, 31st July.

<https://www.theguardian.com/social-care-network/2013/jul/31/social-workers-forgotten-emergency-service>

Associated Press (2020) Most of Seattle council pledges to support police defunding. *The News Tribune*, 11th July.

<https://www.thenewstribune.com/news/state/washington/article244167062.html>

Bowling, B. and Phillips, C. (2007) Disproportionate and discriminatory: Reviewing the evidence on police stop and search. *The Modern Law Review*, 70(6): 936-961.

Brogden, M., and Ellison, G., (2013) *Policing in an age of austerity: A postcolonial perspective*. Routledge.

Brown, D., Cunneen, C., Schwartz, M., Stubbs, J. and Young, C. (2016) *Justice reinvestment: Winding back imprisonment*. Springer.

Chazkel, A., Kim, M. and Paik, A.N. (2020) Worlds without Police. *Radical History Review* (137): 1–12. doi:

<https://doi.org/10.1215/01636545-8092738>

Critical Resistance (2009) *On Policing*.

<http://criticalresistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/CR-statement-abolition-of-policing-2009.pdf>

Critical Resistance (2020) #DefundPolice #FundThePeople #DefendBlackLives: Concrete Steps Toward Divestment from Policing & Investment in Community Safety

https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1gZz_k20UY0JQADf2UKbIS5ivMqo-53Rx

Davis, A.Y. (2011) *Are prisons obsolete?* Seven Stories Press.

Duff, Koshka and Kemp, Tom (2020). Would 'Defund the Police' Work in the UK? Novara Media, 13th June.

<https://novaramedia.com/2020/06/13/would-defund-the-police-work-in-the-uk/>

Eastwood, N., Shiner, M. and Bear, D. (2013) *The numbers in black and white: Ethnic disparities in the policing and prosecution of drug offences in England and Wales*. LSE/Release.

<https://www.release.org.uk/publications/numbers-black-and-white-ethnic-disparities-policing-and-prosecution-drug-offences>

Elliott-Cooper, Adam. (2020) 'Defund the police' is not nonsense. Here's what it really means, *The Guardian*, 2nd July.

<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/jul/02/britain-defund-the-police-black-lives-matter>

Fitzgibbon, Wendy and John Lea. (2020) *Privatising Justice*. Pluto Press.

Gilmore, R.W. (2007) *Golden gulag: Prisons, surplus, crisis, and opposition in globalizing California*. Univ of California Press.

Goldson, B. (2005) *Child imprisonment: A case for abolition*. Youth Justice, 5(2): 77-90.

Hellgren, Mike (2020) Baltimore Police To Move 70 Specialized Units Members To Patrol, No Officer Layoffs Expected After \$22M In Cuts. *CBS Baltimore*.

<https://baltimore.cbslocal.com/2020/07/01/baltimore-police-commissioner-michael-harrison-on-defunding-police-reform-wjz-exclusive/>

Home Office (2018) *Police use of force statistics*, England and Wales April 2017 to March 2018.

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/764894/police-use-of-force-apr2017-mar2018-hosb3018.pdf

Home Office (2019a) *Police use of force statistics*, England and Wales April 2018 to March 2019.

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/853204/police-use-of-force-apr2018-mar2019-hosb3319.pdf

Home Office (2019b) *Police workforce*, England and Wales, as at 30 September 2019, National Statistics. Home Office

Hunter, K. (2019) *Institutionalised criminalisation: Black and minority ethnic children and looked after children in the youth justice system in England and Wales* (Doctoral dissertation, University of Liverpool).

Inquest (2020) *BAME deaths in police custody*.

<https://www.inquest.org.uk/bame-deaths-in-police-custody>

Joseph-Salisbury, Remi (2020) *Race and Racism in English Secondary Schools*. Runnymede Trust.

<https://www.runnymedetrust.org/uploads/publications/pdfs/Runnymede%20Secondary%20Schools%20report%20FINAL.pdf>

Kinsey, Richard, John Lea, and Jock Young (1986) *Losing the fight against crime*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Labour Party (2019) *Labour Manifesto*.

<https://labour.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Real-Change-Labour-Manifesto-2019.pdf>

Levin, Sam (2020) Minneapolis lawmakers vow to disband police department in historic move. *The Guardian*, 8th June.

<https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jun/07/minneapolis-city-council-defund-police-george-floyd>

Los Angeles Times (2020) Editorial: Defund the LAPD? It's time to rethink public safety in Los Angeles. *Los Angeles Times*. 8th June.

<https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2020-06-08/defund-the-lapd-public-safety>

McDowell, M.G. and Fernandez, L.A. (2018) 'Disband, Disempower, and Disarm': Amplifying the Theory and Practice of Police Abolition. *Critical Criminology*, 26(3): 373-391.

McGlynn, C. and Westmarland, N. (2019) Kaleidoscopic justice: sexual violence and victim-survivors' perceptions of justice. *Social & Legal Studies*, 28(2):179-201.

Millie, Andrew (2013) The policing task and the expansion (and contraction) of British policing. *Criminology & Criminal Justice*, 13(2): 143-160.

Millie, Andrew (2014) What are the police for? Re-thinking policing post-austerity. In *The future of policing* (pp. 52-63). Routledge.

Murakawa, N. (2014) *The first civil right: How liberals built prison America*. Oxford University Press.

Noor, Poppy (2018) Met police use Tasers and restraints more often against black people. *The Guardian*, 5th December.

<https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/dec/05/met-police-use-tasers-and-restraints-more-often-against-black-people>

Office for National Statistics (ONS) (2011) *Population of England and Wales by Ethnicity*.

<https://www.ethnicity-facts-figures.service.gov.uk/uk-population-by-ethnicity/national-and-regional-populations/population-of-england-and-wales/latest#by-ethnicity>

Onapa, Emmanuel (2020) Keir Starmer Is Wrong. Defunding The Police is The Only Option. *Huffpost*, 29th May, 2020.

https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/keir-starmer-defund-the-police_uk_5ef9b193c5b6ca970912202e

Parmar, A. (2020) Arresting (non) citizenship: The policing migration nexus of nationality, race and criminalization. *Theoretical Criminology*, 24(1): 28-49.

Phillips, C., Earle, R., Parmar, A. and Smith, D. (2019) Dear British criminology: Where has all the race and racism gone? *Theoretical Criminology*, DOI: 10.1177/1362480619880345

Ryan, M. and Ward, T. (2015) Prison abolition in the UK: They dare not speak its name?. *Social Justice*, 41(3 (137): 107-119.

Scottish Government (2018) *Improving Scotland's Health: Rights, Respect and Recovery*.

<https://www2.gov.scot/Resource/0054/00543437.pdf>

Scruton, P. and Haydon, D. (2002) Challenging the criminalization of children and young people. *Youth Justice: Critical Readings*. London: Sage publications.

Simon, J. (2007) *Governing through crime: How the war on crime transformed American democracy and created a culture of fear*. Oxford University Press.

Vitale, A. (2017) *The end of policing*. London: Verso.

Williams, Kristian (2004) *Our Enemies in Blue: Police and power in America*. New York: Soft Skull Press. Afterword.

Williams, P. and Clarke, B. (2016) *Dangerous associations: Joint enterprise, gangs and racism*. London: Centre for Crime and Justice Studies.

Moving Beyond Crime and Punishment Narratives and Analyses: Critical Race Theory and Racial Specificity in Youth Justice

Esmorie Miller, London South Bank University

In criminology, a developing reliance on the analytical currency of Critical Race Theory (CRT) has found grounding on the basis of CRT's capacity to expand what is known about the experiences of racialized peoples, beyond the conventional myopia of crime and punishment (Ugwudike, 2015; Glynn, 2013; Phillips and Bowling, 2003; Delgado and Stefancic, 1999; Crenshaw *et al.*, 1995; Bell, 1980). The racially specific logic defining CRT's critical scope illuminates what is known about racialized experiences of crime, punishment and justice as characteristic of both invisibility and distortion (Hills-Collins, 2000; Crenshaw, 1989). What is known about racialized peoples, for instance, is problematically defined without consideration for social histories, despite well established reliance on historically informed analyses to illuminate contemporary experiences of factors such as class and gender (Phillips *et al.*, 2019). CRT, therefore, contributes necessary epistemological equalization by specifying historical frames of reference, in attempting to account for, and to remedy, criminology's neglect of racial specificity.

Scholars of race have redoubled calls for greater racial specificity in British criminology, arguing that more enhanced understandings of the contemporary struggles faced by racialized peoples can only be achieved by expanding the analytical scope to consider the historic role of racialization. Criminologists Phillips and associates (2019: 13), for example, argue that 'Re-historicizing the contemporary contours of race is an urgent intellectual task 'notably to better understand present struggles and to negotiate a more egalitarian future. Such appeals, coterminous with efforts to expand the analytical scope, place crime and punishment narratives within a broader frame, to be interrogated in relation to how racialized peoples have fared in their negotiation of modern institutions, in general. Consider, for instance, that the positive rights obligations inaugurated within

modernising institutions to support wellbeing enhancing opportunities and resources for the modern individual, including civil, political and social rights (Marshall, 1950) did not extend to racialized peoples. According to periodization, the occurrence of (and need for) the Civil Rights Movement makes this exclusion abundantly clear. Indeed, as such rights expanded a parallel, paradoxical process of racial derogation took root and as noted by those like activist Michelle Alexander ([2012] 2020) the penal estate became a primary site of recognition for racialized peoples, within a transformative colonial context. Unlike Marshall's exposition of the progress built into the recognition upon modernity, the racial specificity supported by CRT makes it possible to explore the distinct positioning of racialized peoples within this history. Ultimately, to understand crime and punishment, it is necessary to interrogate how racialized peoples have fared in their negotiation of the modern institutions purportedly inaugurated to support human progress.

Against this backdrop, struggles defining the contemporary experiences of racialized youth remain open to the kind of historically expanded explanatory scope CRT supports. Indeed, youth justice (YJ) itself provides a unique opportunity. For instance, to date, the place race occupies in early twentieth century youth penal reform, in Britain remains largely¹ (Cox, 2018) unexplored, and this is despite the rich knowledge that numerous studies on gender and class contribute to our understanding of those contemporary experiences (Shore, 2011). A CRT approach supports the proposal that racialized youth's contemporary struggles are best understood as continuities of a broader historic exclusion from the privileges associated with the modern expansion of rights, including those established in early twentieth century youth penal reform. For YJ, the possibilities for exploring contemporary crime and punishment narratives as part of a longer trajectory of cross institutional marginalization is particularly unique, since criminal justice interventions occurred through a range of institutions, of which correction remains only one part. Historically, exclusion from these did not simply mean exclusion from carceral control; instead, exclusion signified prohibition from key resources, identified through the institutional advocacy professing the necessity to support youth's individual and

¹ Cox, P. (2018) 'Race, Delinquency and Difference in Twentieth Century Britain', in Cox, P. and Shore, H. (eds.) *Becoming Delinquent: British and European Youth, 1650-1950*. London: Routledge, pp.159-178. This work is a social history and not criminology.

social development. The task for CRT is to interrogate the continued relevance of this history, particularly the role of institutions.

The proposal to look beyond crime and punishment is a call to understand that no single institution matters more than the other so we should look at how youth fare across institutions, in terms of their levels of exclusion—after all, by the time youth encounter criminal justice they are said to have experienced a plethora of deficits (Lammy, 2017), noted here as cross institutional failures to support wellbeing.

Philosopher Denise da Silva's (2007) admonition on the lack of ethical crisis in the continued global impact of anti-Black racial discrimination is also a commentary on the role institutions play. Consistent with the CRT logic, Da Silva (2007: 35) argues that 'For the arsenal of raciality does precisely that when it produces both (a) the affectable (subaltern) subjects that can be excluded from juridical universality without unleashing an ethical crisis. 'Da Silva alludes to the taken-for-granted response to the disproportionate levels of punishment, in general, and its correlate exclusion, in particular, meted out to racialized youth. In England and Wales, for instance, the normalizing of particular practices such as the inclusion of over 22,000 Black Asian and Minority Ethnic individuals (Lammy, 2017) on the Police National Databases, sustains the crime and punishment lens at the expense of considerations for the long term implications for these youth. According to one devastating estimate: 'The result in adulthood is that their names could show up on criminal record checks for careers ranging from accountancy and financial services to plumbing, window cleaning and driving a taxi '(Lammy, 2017: 5). This concerns more than crime and punishment and invites consideration of how indices of crime and punishment suture penalty into youth's existence. My own research bears out the claim that the wider social life of Black youth is rife with deviance amplification and criminalization, as illustrated in the following excerpts taken from my fieldwork:

Stop and searches happen. Police are not fire fighters they can't wait for a crime to happen (Field Interviewee).

When a crime happens what we hear is male, black, baggy blue jeans. This is very general. So, we stop each group of black kids we see and question them

asking about their criminal history. Some people get stopped more than five times per week (Field Interviewee).

Adapting Da Silva's perspective, sociologist Sherene Razack (2014) examines punishment meted out to racialized youth within contemporary YJ systems, such as Canada. For Razack, the YJ system does not exist autonomously, but is an offshoot of the modern system and, like other institutions within this sphere, was built on a narrative excluding racialized youth from the universal category of what it means to be citizen, person, and social partner; this is a context where being among the included denotes being White, European, upper-class and male. Razack (2014: 2-3) argues that 'It bears emphasizing Silva's point that to be excluded from the universal is to be placed at a social and moral distance from the European. Violence can be directed with impunity at those outside the domain of justice. 'In Razack's equation, placement at both social and moral distance from the 'European 'is part of a normalization of exclusion from personhood and citizenship, indicating an outsider status which places one beyond institutional obligations of care, in general. It is within this arrangement where punishment becomes the normalized mode of recognition; moreover, penalty itself is sustained more widely due to the disciplinary outcome wrought by exclusion from opportunities and resources. The logic informing these analyses attest to the need to move beyond the customary crime and punishment lens and to consider racialized youth's situation within a longer trajectory of their universally legitimized exclusion from the features marked out as equality, impartiality and personhood.

The English context is rife with examples of the crime and punishment myopia. Here, I draw on Labour Member of Parliament David Lammy's (2017) account of racial discrimination in England and Wales. Consider clear misnomers in Lammy's characterization of contemporary institutions, for racialized youth: Lammy indicts the criminal justice system (CJS), exploring its role in the racialization of deviance and the subsequent criminalization of disproportionate numbers of Black and other racialized youth. In emphasizing the CJS as a failure, he represents other institutions as more (if only relatively) progressive, hailing the increased numbers of racialized youth 'achieving in school' and being admitted to Higher Education (HE), and arguing that 'Powerful, high-profile institutions, like the House of Commons, are slowly

becoming more diverse '(Lammy, 2017: 3). Against the backdrop of advancement for racialized peoples, 'our justice system bucks the [purportedly progressive] trend (ibid). It is easy to be taken in by the shining prospect of greater acceptance for racialized peoples within institutions which historically excluded them from participation. However, read more closely the misnomers become apparent (reflecting a narrowness of thinking which informs racialized youth's equivocal positioning as the most punished and the most punishable). Indeed, recent scholarship (Philips *et al.*, 2019; Maynard, 2018) has exposed the reality of how racialized peoples fare in their negotiation of the very institutions Lammy highlights as progressive, including high profile roles. For racialized peoples, being admitted does not equate to equal recognition and equitable treatment.

Remarkably, Lammy's is decidedly the most recent of a multitude of reports and investigations into institutional racism, a now standard band-aid response which itself speaks to the distinct and continued lack of progress in race relations (See also Macpherson, 1999; Scarman, 1981). Indeed, that disproportionality—denoting systematized marginalization from resources and opportunities—is the terror gnashing at the heels of Black youth. It can be observed in their deficit positioning across the varied institutions, where modern individuals are otherwise invited to negotiate wellbeing enhancing resources and opportunities. Record numbers of school exclusions, for instance, for racialized youth dispute notions of progress offered in the report's conclusion (Graham, 2016). The same can be said for Black youth's experiences of HE, notable in an ongoing debate, polarized around two narratives: the first narrative, branded an *Attainment Gap*, professes that racialized students struggle to achieve (Peterson and Ramsay, 2020; Runnymede, 2012). This first account has met with admonition from an alternate school looking at the issue as an *Awards Gap*, reorienting debates from the focus on students 'efforts, to also consider structural deficits (UCL, 2020). Youth do not fare better outside of education, showing high representation in care and therefore the care-to-prison pipeline (Lammy 2017); they have increasing levels of mental health concerns; and they face overall struggles to secure meaningful employment to support progress towards career, family and citizenship (ibid). It is important, therefore, to examine the extent to which for young people this is especially nefarious; after all, this widespread

deficit positioning holds hostage their transformative potential, amid criminal labelling.

In summary, a CRT logic contributes much needed racial specificity to customarily narrow criminological research approaches into the struggles faced by racialized peoples. In taking social histories as a starting point for such queries, the framework enables a more expanded analytical scope, beyond the apparent biases of a limiting crime and punishment lens. Through the CRT frame, when observing YJ in particular it becomes apparent that the quality of individual transformation is bound up with the quality of the recognition received in the negotiation of those institutional tiers purportedly created to enhance individual wellbeing. All these considerations form the expanded scope for thinking about the cross section of deficits disproportionately impacting Black youth, showing these to be beyond the matter of crime and punishment. Indeed, thinking in this more expansive way calls explicitly for contemplation that the penal estate is not the only institution where justice matters. Justice is a cross-institutional concern. And it is the historic exclusion from access to justice that contributes to, and sustains, the intertwining of the lives of racialized youth with crime and punishment.

References

Alexander, M. ([2012] 2020) *The new Jim Crow: Mass incarceration in the age of colorblindness*. The New Press.

BAME Awarding Gap: new staff toolkit (2020) University College London. <https://www.ucl.ac.uk/teaching-learning/news/2020/may/bame-awarding-gap-new-staff-toolkit>

Bell Jr, D.A. (1980) Brown v. Board of Education and the interest convergence dilemma. *Harvard Law Review*, pp.518-533.

Collins, P.H. (2000) *Black Feminist Thought* New York: Routledge.

Cox, P. (2018) 'Race, Delinquency and Difference in Twentieth Century Britain', in Cox, P. and Shore, H. (eds.) *Becoming Delinquent: British and European Youth, 1650-1950*. London: Routledge, pp.159-178.

Crenshaw, Kimberlé; Gotanda, Neil; Peller, Gary; Thomas, Kendall, eds. (1995) *Critical Race Theory: The Key Writings that Formed the Movement*. New York: The New Press.

Crenshaw, K. (1989) Demarginalizing the intersection of race and sex: A black feminist critique of antidiscrimination doctrine, feminist theory and antiracist politics. *University Chicago Legal Forum*, pp.139-167.

Da Silva, D.F. (2007) *Toward a global idea of race* (Vol. 27). University of Minnesota Press.

Glynn, M. (2013) *Black men, invisibility and crime: Towards a critical race theory of desistance*. Routledge.

Graham, K. (2016) 'The British School-to-Prison Pipeline', in Andrews, K. and Palmer, L.A. (eds.) *Blackness in Britain*. London: Routledge. Chapter 10.

Greater London Council (1985) *Reorganisation of the Metropolitan Police*, London: GLC Police Committee.

Lammy, D. (2017) *The Lammy review: An independent review into the treatment of, and outcomes for, Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic individuals in the Criminal Justice System*. HM Government.

Macpherson, Lord (1999) *The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry*, Cm. 4262–I.

Marshall, T.H. (1950) *Citizenship and Social Class*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Maynard, R. (2017) *Policing Black lives: State violence in Canada from slavery to the present*. Fernwood Publishing.

Scarman, Lord (1981) *The Brixton Disorders 10–12 April 1981*, Cmnd. 8427.

Ugwudike, P. (2015) *An introduction to critical criminology*. Policy Press.

Peterson, C. and Ramsay, D. (2020) Reducing the gap! Reciprocal mentoring between Black, Asian and minority ethnic (BAME) students and senior leaders at the University of Gloucestershire. *Perspectives: Policy and Practice in Higher Education*, pp.1-6.

Phillips, C. and Bowling, B. (2003) Racism, ethnicity and criminology. Developing minority perspectives. *British Journal of Criminology*, 43(2): 269-290.

Phillips, C., Earle, R., Parmar, A. and Smith, D. (2019) Dear British criminology: Where has all the race and racism gone? *Theoretical Criminology*, pp.1-20.

Razack, S. (2014) Racial Terror: Torture and three teenagers in prison. *Borderlands*, 13(1): 1-27.

Runnymede Trust, Briefing on ethnicity and educational attainment (2012) – <http://www.runnymedetrust.org/uploads/Parliamentary%20briefings/EducationWHdebateJune2012.pdf>

Shore, H. (2011) Inventing and Re-Inventing the Juvenile Delinquent in British History. *Memoria Y Civilizacion*, 14, pp.1–31.

Professor Roger Matthews (1949-2020)

A pioneering scholar and major criminological thinker, Roger Matthews was a key figure and contributor to the Left Realist school. His rich body of work demonstrates an intellectual curiosity spanning a wide range of research interests, including: prostitution; prisons and penal policy; armed robbery; crime, disorder and community safety; anti-social behaviour; diversion from custody and community based sanctions and desistance. Intellectually he was always ahead of the curve, writing incisive, sometimes coruscating, articles about the latest criminological 'big idea' which, nonetheless, always advanced criminological debates. He was a fiercely critical voice and was never afraid to go against the tide of criminological opinion. Intimate knowledge of theory framed his work and enabled his clarity of thought and prose. To the very end, even in hospital, Roger continued to work on completing his last unpublished (as yet) work *Critical Penology*. Theoretically rich, critical, timely and practically engaged, together with a 'no-nonsense' approach to criminology, his work has had a broad appeal beyond the academic community. Framed by an ethics of compassion and justice, and driven by a strong desire to make a real difference to people's lives, he tirelessly worked to build bridges between academe and policy makers.

Proud of his working-class origins, he was committed to working in what he called 'real universities with real students', with a recognition that knowledge was not only the preserve of approved intellectuals. From his role as a Senior Lecturer in Criminology at Middlesex Polytechnic (1977-90), he moved to the University of Leicester, then returned in 1993 to Middlesex, first as Reader and then as Professor of Criminology until 2004. He was Professor of Criminology at London South Bank University (2004-11) and finally at the University of Kent. Roger also made a significant contribution to wider international critical networks. Close to his heart was *The Common Study Programme in Critical Criminology* – an international network of universities committed to developing critical criminology. He was an active member of the *European Group for the Study of Deviance and Social Control* and more recently worked with a range of scholars and policy makers in Latin America.

To those who knew him best, his legacy goes beyond his scholarly endeavours. He leaves a wonderful imprint on those of us lucky to have known him. He was a wonderful friend and support to a great many people coming up from the margins. Friendships with peers and colleagues spanned almost half a century. Many radical feminists considered him a friend and ally. Roger was a rare breed in academia, combining intellectual rigour and an occasionally gruff exterior with a generosity of spirit, deep compassion, kindness, loyalty and a mischievous playfulness - a recipe for solid and long-lasting friendships. With a love of London, he followed the fortunes of Tottenham Hotspur and lived life with verve. Hugely sociable and the instigator of all sorts of get-togethers, he was at his happiest when sharing a drink with students, colleagues and friends. He will be greatly missed - rest well Roger.

Roger died of the effects of Covid-19 on the 7 April 2020 aged 71. He is survived by his wife Jane, their two daughters, and five grandchildren.

Professor Peter Rushton

It is with great sadness that we share news of the death of our friend and colleague Professor Peter Rushton, aged 68. Pete will be greatly missed by all of his colleagues at the University of Sunderland where he worked since 1979. A Professor of Historical Sociology, Pete studied for an undergraduate degree in Archaeology and Anthropology at Cambridge University and continued his postgraduate and doctoral studies in historical sociology at Manchester University. As an academic, Pete made a significant and varied contribution to multiple academic fields over the course of his career including those of history, sociology and criminology. He published widely on the subjects of crime and punishment, disability and mental health, gender and sexuality, the history of criminal law, and more recently on treason and terrorism. A staunch socialist and trade unionist, Pete's work was grounded in a historical materialist perspective and reflected his strong interest in political economy and inequality. In partnership with his long-term co-author, Gwenda Morgan, Pete developed a rich and detailed historical analysis of various aspects of crime and punishment between the 17th and 19th centuries and greatly advanced our understanding of numerous types of offending from petty theft to race rioting, to that of rape and murder. The breadth of his research and the depth of his knowledge is reflective of his dedication to his academic craft. Anyone who had the privilege of knowing Pete will be aware that he possessed the rare quality of being a 'true' academic and that his untameable curiosity and encyclopaedic knowledge permeated every interaction he shared with others. However, the truly magical aspect of Pete lay in the fact that his incredible intellect was not accompanied by a sense of elitism or loftiness. Pete was an extremely kind man who was incredibly generous with his time and knowledge which he used to support both his students and colleagues alike. Above all, with his amusing insights and mischievous contributions to meetings, Pete brightened the daily experience of university life and for this he will be greatly missed.

Stephen. J. Macdonald & Kate Tudor

Professor David Bayley (1933-2020)

David Bayley has rightly been described as one of a group of “greats” in policing research from a generation, including Bittner and Goldstein, who have passed on a rich inheritance of thought about policing. Lest anyone think that that their work is in the past and has nothing to say to current scholars, David’s work stands out as a reminder to librarians and scholars not to discard work just because it is not recent. Right from his first publications, David confronted the issues of police relationships with minority communities in the USA and corruption and democratic oversight of police forces in Asia. Furthermore, he kept at these issues throughout his life: in May 2019, as the Director of the Cambridge programme for senior Indian police, I had the pleasure of watching him engage in debate with 90 Inspector-Generals about the failures of police reform in India. As ever, David gave no quarter and, given his reputation in India, the Indian officers expected none. He had first put his feet on ground in India in the 1960s and his commitment to India and the reform of Indian policing won him respect and an almost iconic status.

David was not first and foremost a criminologist. He earned his PhD in political science at Princeton University and it was this core discipline that enabled him to see the forest rather than the trees (a description from one of his PhD students, Ed Maguire). In his teaching and writings, there was always a strong focus on democracy and the pivotal role that policing could play in sustaining democratic values. For most of his professional life, he was professor of criminal justice at the State University of New York at Albany where he was the Dean of the School of Criminal Justice and a Distinguished Emeritus Professor. He was highly respected for his teaching and mentoring. Having taught alongside him, I have never watched any one use so few words, so carefully chosen, to make an impact.

His eighteen books should be on every police scholar’s bookshelves. However, he did not just leave his thoughts in print: his academic work became the practical foundation for promoting fair and democratic policing. He was also involved in creating new policing policies in the aftermath of political conflict in Bosnia and

Northern Ireland. His passion was creating policing policies that relied on building community ties and minimizing coercion.

My abiding memory will always be David in Tilley hat and sandals riding his bicycle to the next lecture at the National Police Academy of India full of passion and hope that he could change the next generation of police leaders. We need more criminologists with David's passion to engage and challenge police leaders all over the world.

Dr Peter Neyroud, University of Cambridge.

Professor Douglas Sharp (1945-2020)

I learned Professor Douglas (Doug) Sharp, my friend, former colleague and a great mentor passed away from cancer on Easter Sunday 2020. Doug joined the University of Central England (now Birmingham City University) in 1995, firstly as a lecturer in Policing, and then serving as Director of the Centre for Criminal Justice Policy and Research and as Professor until he retired properly in October 2008. I say “properly” because as Doug himself noted, he had already retired once after having had a full career in the police, and then enjoyed a second in the University. On his second retirement he went off to spend a “proper” retirement with his wife Christina and his children and grandchildren. He moved from Birmingham to Totnes in Devon, and largely left criminology and policing behind. Those, like me, who knew him from BCU moved far and wide out into academia, and when they met, they always talked of Doug fondly. His second and proper retirement meant he stayed in touch only in a limited way.

Before becoming an academic, Doug was a police ‘academic’. I keep on my office wall a newspaper article from the Birmingham Post in the 1970s when, as Sergeant Doug Sharp, he had graduated from the University of Aston. Doug was described as the sole ‘Bright young bobby on the beat’. Doug had joined the police after attending King Edwards Grammar School. He undertook his first degree at Aston University in psychology sponsored by what was then Birmingham City police (the West Midlands force only arrived in 1974). Recruits to the force with four good A-levels were a rarity in the 1960s. This made him something of an oddity in the police, where his colleagues gave him the moniker “prof” long before he earned that title. It gave him a love of education and he undertook an MA at Keele in Criminology in the 1970s. Doug was not a police officer turned academic; he was both. He was a man who thought about the world and formed his own views. In the police he rose to the rank of Chief Superintendent and served with HMIC. This gave him a great assortment of engaging anecdotes and stories that students loved, but for Doug the purpose of the academic study of policing was always critical thought and social improvement. When Doug spoke in his calm, measured way everyone listened.

As an academic and a friend Doug was ever a calm and sensible voice; he always encouraged people to see the bigger picture, look at all sides, and think critically. Doug took a keen interest in the world, in art, history, music, theatre, politics and sport. He was well read and well informed, and inspired students to read for degrees and to see learning as a lifelong process. As an academic he possessed a scientific and evidence-based mind in relation to policing long before that became the popular terminology it is today. Yet more than that though he took a keen interest in people and was a kind, generous and encouraging mentor to many students and young academics. Doug's output as an academic was not prolific, but it was of real quality. He published with, and encouraged, less established colleagues, on areas such as interventions to address problematic alcohol use, experiences of policing in the community of young people from BAME groups and, policing, legitimacy and vigilantism. He also produced (with David Wilson, and John Ashton), 'What Everyone in Britain Should Know About the Police' (2001, Oxford), a text that introduced students in an accessible manner to the academic side of policing long before it became the growth subject it is now.

I suspect Doug never truly realised what an influence he had on so many people, and perhaps, as in my case, they never really got enough chance to tell him. He was many rare things now not too evident in academia: humble, witty, modest, reflective, kind, and decent. He was a leader rather than a manager. He had patience and integrity and knew the importance of setting a good example for others, lessons he taught to an array of people now working in both criminal justice and academia. I for one am thankful for knowing him and for all he taught me. Rest in Peace Doug.

James Treadwell, Professor of Criminology
Staffordshire University

Regional and Network Events

BSC Vulnerability Network Launch Event

Tuesday 20th October 2020 16:30-19:00

The British Society of Criminology Vulnerabilities Research Network is pleased to be holding its launch event at the University of South Wales.

The use of the term 'vulnerability' is increasing in public, political and academic discourse and has become a key concern of criminologists and criminal justice practitioners internationally. This network provides a forum for discussion on the complexities inherent to researching vulnerability within the context of crime and justice. To this end, it intends to bring academics, practitioners, and policy makers together to establish a 'state of the art' criminal justice vulnerabilities research agenda, paying particular attention to:

- Identifying needs and gaps in the research capacity of academics, practitioners, and policymakers;
- The range and adequacy of theoretical and methodological tools used in criminal vulnerabilities research, and the ethics of such research;
- relationships between statutory and non-statutory agencies in responding to vulnerabilities crime;
- The factors that shape these criminal justice responses to vulnerabilities crimes.

The launch event will be co-chaired by Associate Prof Harriet Pierpoint (University of South Wales) and Dr Roxanna Dehaghani (Cardiff University) (Co-Chairs of the VRN) with a keynote speech by Professor Emeritus Gisli Gudjonsson CBE entitled, 'What does it mean to be vulnerable and what are the challenges?'

The principal focus of this event is to promote the network with a view to garnering membership at all levels. If you cannot attend the network launch event but would like to become a member of the BSC Vulnerabilities Research network, please email: bscvrn@gmail.com

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic we, along with most other learned societies, were forced to cancel our 2020 programme of events. This decision meant members have had no traditional opportunities to network with their peers and present their research. In recognition of these lost opportunities we wanted to offer some alternative ways of engaging. A number of online events and showcases were presented during the summer and given the innovation and imagination of BSC regional groups and specialist networks, there will be more announced before the end of the year.

Forging new conversations and collaborations in criminology

Organised by the Historical Criminology Network, this virtual workshop was designed to bring together scholars to initiate conversations around common interests or new directions for research in criminology. The workshop comprised working groups on the following topics: mobile methods; police corruption; history and interdisciplinarity; atonement; dark tourism; path dependence and criminal justice institutions; and protection. Over 50 people joined the event from 7 countries, participating in fruitful and wide-ranging discussions. The event was lived scribed by Laura Evans of Nifty Fox Creative, leaving an engaging visual record of the day's discussions. <https://www.britsoccrim.org/networks/hc/#Past%20Events>

Global Injustice – Beyond the Conference 2020

<https://www.britsoccrim.org/conference/global-injustice/>

Executive Board 2020-21

President - Professor Sandra Walklate

Vice President – Professor Pam Davies

Immediate Past President – Professor Peter Squires

Company Secretary - Professor Allan Brimicombe

Executive Secretary – Dr Rachel Morris

Treasurer - Professor Andromachi Tseloni

Chair of the Conferences Committee – Dr Vicky Heap

Chair of Prizes Committee – Professor James Treadwell

Chair of the Professional Affairs and Ethics Committee - Professor Azrini Wahidin

Chair of the Regional Groups and Specialist Networks Committee - Professor

Andrew Millie who took on this role from Dr Harriet Pierpoint

Chair of the Publications Committee – Dr Lizzie Seal

Chair of the Public Relations Committee – Dr Nic Groombridge

Chair of the Postgraduate Committee – Dr Carina O'Reilly

Chair of the Early Career Committee – Dr Jayne Price and Dr Adam Lynes

Chair of the Crime and Justice Statistics Network – Professor Allan Brimicombe

Chair of the Critical Criminology Network – Dr Oliver Smith

Chair of the Green Criminology Network – Dr James Heydon

Chair of the Hate Crime Network – Dr Jo Smith

Chair of the Historical Criminology Network - Dr David Churchill

Chair of the Learning and Teaching Network –Associate Professor Kate Strudwick

Chair of the Policing Network – Dr Matthew Jones

Chair of the Prison Research Network – Professor David Best

Chair of the Race Matters Network - Dr Alpa Parmar

Chair of the Victims Network – Dr Hannah Bows

Chair of the Vulnerability Research Network - Associate Professor Harriet Pierpoint

Chair of the Women, Crime and Criminal Justice Network – Dr Marian Duggan

Chair of the Youth Criminology/Youth Justice Network - Professor Barry Goldson

Executive Director Dr Charlotte Harris

Membership and communications coordinator Dr Helen Jones